




































































The delegation of power  to corporate directors and officers  (Insiders), an essential  trait of 
modern  firm management  in  the  context  of  capitalism,  presents  desirable  efficiency  advantages. 
However, it also confers broad discretion to Insiders . This discretion, when unchecked, may lead to 
self‐interested  opportunistic  behaviour  detrimental  to  the  firm  and  to  the  outside  shareholders 
(Outsiders) who supply finance to the firm but do not have management power. 
Conflicts  between  Insiders  and  Outsiders  may  emerge  from  either  general  governance 
decisions or from particular transactions (ie. takeovers). In extreme cases, these conflicts can lead to 
the bankruptcy of the firm or, in more typical cases, to the extraction of private benefits for Insiders, 
shareholder  expropriation  and  value‐reducing  actions  for  the  firm. We  take  the perspective  of  an 
outside shareholder to explore corporate governance mechanisms available in the US and Canada. 
After  reviewing  in  Part  1  the  core  theories  underlying  the  study  of  power  in  the modern 
corporation (separation of ownership and control and agency conflicts), we focus in Part 2 on the (1) 














La  délégation  du  pouvoir  de  gestion  aux  administrateurs  et  aux  gestionnaires,  une 




Les  conflits  entre  ces  deux  classes  d’agents  peuvent  émerger  à  la  fois  de  décisions  de 
gouvernance  générale  ou  de  transactions  particulières  (ie.  offre  publique  d’achat).  Dans  les  cas 
extrêmes, ces conflits peuvent mener à la faillite de la firme. Dans les cas plus typiques, ils mènent 
l’extraction  de  bénéfices  privés  pour  les  administrateurs  et  gestionnaires,  l’expropriation  des 
actionnaires,  et  des  réductions  de  valeur  pour  la  firme.  Nous  prenons  le  point  de  vue  d’un  petit 
actionnaire minoritaire  pour  explorer  les méchanismes  de  gouvernance  disponibles  au  Canada  et 
aux États‐Unis.  
Après une synthèse dans la Partie 1 des théories sous‐jacentes à l’étude du pouvoir dans la 
corporation  (séparation de  la  propriété  et  du  contrôle  et  les  conflits  d’agence),  nous  concentrons 
notre analyse dans la Partie 2 sur les différents types de méchanismes (1) de gouvernance interne, 
(2) juridiques et (3) marchands, qui confèrent du pouvoir aux deux classes d’agents. Nous examinons 
comment  les  intérêts  de  ces  deux  classes  peuvent  être  réalignés  afin  de  prévenir  et  résoudre  les 
conflits  au  sein  de  la  firme.  La  Partie  3  explore  un  équilibre  dynamique de  pouvoir  corporatif  qui 
cherche  à minimiser  le  potentiel  d’opportunisme  toute  en  préservant  une  quantité  de  discrétion 
suffisante  pour  la  gestion  efficace  de  la  firme.  Nous  analysons  des  moyens  pour  renforcer  les 
protections des actionnaires minoritaires et proposons un survol des pistes de réforme possibles. 









































1.1.1  Self‐Interest ........................................................................................................... 3 
1.1.2  Ownership and Control .......................................................................................... 3 
1.1.3  The Modern Corporation ....................................................................................... 4 
1.1.4  Capitalism in the 19th and 20th Century.................................................................. 5 
1.2  Power Dynamics in the Modern Corporation........................................................10 




1.3.1  Conflict Configurations ........................................................................................ 15 
1.3.2  Conflict Theory..................................................................................................... 15 




2.1.1  General Governance Conflicts ............................................................................. 19 
2.1.2  Particular Transactions Conflicts.......................................................................... 20 
2.1.2.1  Related‐Party Transactions............................................................................ 20 
2.1.2.1.1  Traditional Self‐Dealing ........................................................................ 21 
2.1.2.1.2  Excess Pay and Perks ............................................................................ 21 
2.1.2.1.3  Appropriation of Corporate Opportunities........................................... 25 
2.1.2.1.4  Insider Trading...................................................................................... 26 
2.1.2.2  Major Transactions ........................................................................................ 27 
2.2  Insiders: Power Capture and Opportunism...........................................................29 
2.2.1  Internal Governance Mechanisms ....................................................................... 29 
2.2.1.1  Control over Elections and Compensation .................................................... 29 










2.3.1  Internal Governance Mechanisms ....................................................................... 54 





2.3.1.2.2  Decision Rights ..................................................................................... 59 
2.3.1.3  Transaction Rights ......................................................................................... 64 
2.3.2  Regulatory Mechanisms....................................................................................... 65 
2.3.2.1  Corporate Law ............................................................................................... 65 
2.3.2.1.1  Fiduciary Duty Standards...................................................................... 65 




2.3.2.2.1  Insider Trading Rules ............................................................................ 73 
2.3.2.2.2  Takeover Rules ..................................................................................... 74 
2.3.3  Market Mechanisms ............................................................................................ 74 
2.3.3.1  Stock Sale....................................................................................................... 74 
2.3.3.2  Concentration ................................................................................................ 75 
2.3.3.3  Takeovers....................................................................................................... 75 








3.2.2  Reform Objectives ............................................................................................... 84 
3.2.2.1  Corporate Objective (Shareholder Primacy v. Stakeholder Theory).............. 85 
3.2.2.2  Legislator Objective (Permissive v. Imperative framework) .......................... 89 
3.2.3  The “Bring Your Own Governance” Model .......................................................... 91 
3.2.3.1  Shareholder Choice........................................................................................ 91 
3.2.3.2  Self‐Enforcing Model ..................................................................................... 92 
3.3  What to Reform: Exploring Less Traveled Paths....................................................95 
3.3.1  Recent Reform Paths ........................................................................................... 95 







Over  the  past  decade,  the  financial  markets  and  the  confidence  of  investors  in  North 
America have been severely tested by two important strings of corporate scandals.  
The first wave of scandals occurred from 2000 to 2003 and featured mainly corporate giants 
such  as  Enron,  WorldCom,  Adelphia,  Global  Crossing  and  Tyco.  The  second  wave  of  scandals 
occurred  from 2008  to 2009 and  featured  financial  giants  such as Bear Stearns,  Lehman Brothers, 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG.  
Both  waves  had  similarly  devastating  consequences  for  the  North  American  economy: 
bankruptcies,  restructurings, employee  layoffs,  shareholder  losses and  lawsuits,  the destruction of 
billions of dollars of value, and large government bailouts financed with taxpayer money. 
At first glance, different mechanisms seemed to have triggered these two waves of massive 
failures. On  the  one hand,  the  corporate  giants  failed  because  of  financial misstatements,  out‐of‐
control personal  loans to executives, and dormant auditing practices by accountants. On the other 
hand,  the  financial giants  failed because of bad  loans  to homeowners,  the collapse of  the housing 
bubble and the implosion of complex structured financial products. 
However, in many ways, the underlying roots of these failures may actually be quite similar.  




Closer  analysis  also  reveals  that  failings  in  both  waves  related  not  only  to  elements  of 
human  nature,  but  to many  specific  corporate  governance mechanisms,  such  as  the  oversight  of 
executive  compensation,  corporate  elections  and  related‐party  transactions.  Exploitable  flaws  in 
these corporate mechanisms created a poor governance environment in these corporations, which 

















and  other  stakeholders)  in  order  to  create  a  healthy  corporate  governance  environment  that 
stimulates the creation and preservation of value. 
In  terms  of  the  methodology  of  this  paper,  its  aim  is  to  provide  the  reader  with  a  solid 
theoretical  overview of  the  key  corporate  governance  concepts pertinent  to  analyzing  conflicts  of 
power within the corporation in Canada and the US. Our analysis follows an approach rooted in the 
economic  analysis  of  law.  Further,  breadth  is  often  preferred  to  depth  (except  for  a  few  core 
recurring  issues,  such  as  corporate  elections  and  executive  compensation)  in  order  to  compose  a 
summary of the often extensive scholarship on most of the various relevant corporate governance 
issues.  As  best  possible,  our  analysis  looks  to  organize  governance mechanisms  by  whether  they 
generally confer more power to Insiders or to Outsiders. Our analysis also insists slightly more on the 













In  1776,  Adam  Smith  posits  in  The  Wealth  of  Nations  that  self‐interested  competition 
maximizes  the welfare of  society.  If  individuals pursue  their own  “wants  and needs”,  the  invisible 







argue  that  we  would  enjoy  our  current  standard  of  living  had  it  not  been  for  return‐seeking 
entrepreneurs willing  to  tackle ambitious and  risky projects out of  their own rational  self‐interest. 
However,  for  all  its merits,  as  Smith exposes,  excess or unbridled  self‐interest  can equally  lead  to 
undesirable value‐destroying outcomes.  
Several  centuries  later,  it  is  hard  not  to  witness  the  dual  role  of  self‐interest  at  work. 
Whereas  the  self‐interest  of men  created  important  organizations  such  as  Enron, WorldCom  and 
Tyco at the end of the 20th century, and Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG at the start of the 

























The  traditional  concept  of  property,  as  defended by Adam Smith,  involved  the  reunion of 
ownership  and  control.  An  individual  property  owner  had  all  the  rights  of  possession  over  the 
property and could use them or dispose of as he thought proper. For example, an individual owner 
of a small  family  retail business could personally choose the managers of  the store, could operate 
the business as he thought fit, could take the profit he deemed appropriate, could decide to close 
the trade and could even decide to sell the store if he owned it. Berle and Means summarize Adam 
Smith’s  view  this  way:  “To  Adam  Smith  and  his  followers,  private  property  was  a  unity  involving 
possession. Ownership and control were combined”7. 
In this new form of organization, the modern corporation, Berle and Means suggest that the 
explosion  of  the  atom  of  property  inevitably  leads  to  conflict  as  soon  as  the  self‐interest  of  the 








to  undertake  endeavours  too  large  for  himself  to  handle  alone.  Projects  like  railroads,  industrial 
technologies or telecom networks were by their sheer size too risky for one party to manage, or to 
finance. Specialization of tasks became increasingly necessary to complete these ambitious projects, 
which  gave  rise  to  two  classes  of  corporate  agents:  suppliers  of  management  and  suppliers  of 
finance. 
Suppliers  of  management  are  what  Berle  and  Means  refer  to  as  those  individuals  who 
“control the wealth” or “control the destinies of the firm”8. They are often professional managers, 
who  by  their  experience  and  industry  knowledge,  can  “secure  industrial  efficiency  and  produce 
profits” for the firm. Suppliers of finance are what Berle and Means refer to as those individuals “to 





relationships  between  these  two  groups,  especially  in  that  its  “legal  personality”  permitted  the 
separation of management and finance, also understood as separation of control and ownership.  





















around 1830‐1840. The  first  factories were also opened  in England, with a  silk  factory at Derby  in 
1721 and bronze factory in Bristol in 1746. In general, the first industrial revolution is characterized 
by  early  production  breakthroughs  in  the  mechanical  industries  of  textiles,  new  techniques  of 
metallurgy (including iron), expansion of roads and other commercial channels (including channels , 
railways,  etc  ...),  and  the  introduction  of  new  energy  sources  (including  steam  and  coal).  These 
developments introduce significant increases in productivity and capacity.  
The  Second  Industrial  Revolution,  an  extension  of  the  first,  began  around  1850‐70  and 
marked  the  development  of  new  technologies,  further  increasing  the  productivity  of  enterprises, 
namely:  the  internal combustion engine,  the development of ships with steam engines, electricity, 
communication  facilities  (including  typography)  and  ultimately  the  assembly  line.  The  second 
industrial revolution also marked the replacement of England by Germany and the United States as 
the dominant economies. In the United States, we associate this period to inventors such as Edison 
and Westinghouse,  assembly  line  pioneers  such  as  Taylor  and Gantt,  and  to  industrialists  such  as 
  
6 
Ford.  It  is  through advances and  inventions of  such men  that  the grouping of workers  in  factories 
became  both  possible  and  desirable.  It  is  therefore  not  surprising  to  see  why,  shortly  after  the 
formation  of  the  first  large  factories,  we  observe  the  formation  of  the  first  major  corporations 
(General Electric, U.S. Steel, Bayer AG and others). These  large public or quasi‐public corporations, 
emerging  as  early  as  1890,  are  concentrated  in  important  new  areas,  including:  automobile 
production,  steel,  chemicals,  petroleum  refining,  electrical  and  hydro  and  power,  among  others. 
According  to  Berle  and Means,  among  the  first  corporations  formed  in  the  US  were  the  Boston 
Manufacturing  Company,  which  operated  textile  plants,  in  1813  (although  it  would  only  attain 
diffuse ownership around 1830‐1840)  and  the New York Central Railroad  in 185310.  In  addition  to 
bringing  about  large  corporations,  the  factories  also  contributed  to  the  development  of  modern 
cities  by  attracting  skilled  workers  around  the  sites  of  these  factories,  thus  helping  to  organize 
overall economic activity.  
Thus,  the  factory  plant  uniquely  enabled  the  consolidation  of  a  large  number  of workers 
under one roof, both in the physical sense and in the figurative sense of bringing employees under 
the  control  of  a  single,  unified  direction.  The  factory  fostered  the  emergence  of  large  public 





initially  created  only  by  special  act  of  government  legislation  under  the  “Charter”  system.  The 
Charter  system was  limited  initially  to public‐vocation  institutions  like  schools.  It would  seem that 
the oldest  corporation was  the  “President and Fellows of Harvard College  (Harvard Corporation)”, 
which received its charter in 1650. Furthermore, beyond this limitation, the government‐run Charter 
system  also  imposed  a  number  of  important  restrictions  on  business  activity.  First,  it  imposed 
restrictions  on  the  mission  and  duration  (e.g.  50  years)  of  the  corporation,  which  allowed  the 
government  to  control  and  organize  competition,  and  allowed  investors  to  know  precisely  the 




In essence,  the government had a very  tight hold on corporations  through  its permit‐style 
Charter system. This is why several noteworthy business pioneers chose to avoid this Charter system 
altogether. Andrew Carnegie’s US Steel was initially constituted as a “limited partnership” and John 
D.  Rockefeller’s  Standard  Oil  was  constituted  as  a  “trust”.  Governments  were  however  quick  to 
recognize  that  liberalization  of  the Charter  system would  create  important new  revenue  streams. 





as  a  separate  entity with  an  eternal  life  beyond  that  of  its mortal  constituents.  Berle  and Means 




The  relaxed  system of  incorporation  also brought  to  the  forefront  another  very  appealing 
feature  of  corporations  distinct  from  other  organizational  options  available  at  the  time  (trusts  or 
partnerships):  limited responsibility. Limited responsibility was made possible by the recognition of 
the corporation as an entity separate from the people owning  it. Legal personality was recognized 
perhaps  originally  in  an  obiter  dictum  from  the  1886  Santa  Clara  County  v.  Southern  Pacific 
Railroad13  case  dealing with  taxation  of  railroad  properties,  about which  Justice  Black  later wrote 
that the court had “decided for the first time that the word 'person' in the amendment did in some 
instances  include  corporations.”14.  Prior,  proprietors were  personally  responsible  for  the  losses  of 
their  enterprise,  making  entrepreneurship  riskier.  Capital  formation  and  risk‐taking  were  greatly 
accelerated by allowing for proprietors to shield their personal wealth from that of the corporation.  




Financial  markets  are  a  critical  platform  to  efficiently  mediate  relationships  between 





establishment  of  the  Constitution  and  the  adoption  of  rules  for  the  NYSE  in  181717.  During  this 
period,  the  securities  of  railroads  and  utilities  dominated  trading  activity.  Early  on,  large  public 
corporations  had  access  to  reliable  financial  markets.  Access  to  capital  markets  facilitated  the 
transition of  private  enterprise  to  the open/public  form.  Through 1835, when  the  trading  volume 
had  already  increased  by  a  multiple  of  50x  in  just  7  years,  and  until  the  late  19th  century,  the 
financial  markets  grew  quickly  to  accommodate  the  capital  requirements  of  large  public 
corporations.  
Financial markets would also gradually provide a new way for individuals to save and invest 
in  the  economic development of  their  country.  The market managed  to  create  an  important  new 
class of investors, small individual shareholders, that would be a growing source of capital for these 
corporations.  These  developments would  eventually  lead  later,  in  the  20th  century,  to  the  era  of 
"popular  capitalism",  where  individual  investors  (not  qualified  managers  for  the  vast  majority) 




the  wealth”18.  Government  savings  plans  played  an  important  role  in  further  promoting  to  small 
investors  the  idea  of  allocating  a  fraction  of  their  savings  as  an  investment  in  large  public 
corporations. In particular, the possibility for employees of holding shares in their personal pension 
or  retirement  portfolio  (401k),  whether  or  not  sponsored  by  the  corporation,  was  an  attractive 
option. 
Corporate  shareholding  plans  also  played  a  key  role  to  enable  individuals  to  massively 
become  shareholders  of  public  corporations.  These  special  plans  were  generally  offered  by  large 
corporations themselves and targeted to either their customers or their employees. A first category 
of special plans aimed to convert consumers into shareholders. According to Berle and Means, the 
first  corporations  to  actively  develop  and  use  such  plans  were  public  utilities.  For  example,  the 
campaign  by  National  Electric  Light  Association  distributed  45,000  shares  to  consumers  between 
1914  and  1919.  The  popularity  of  these  campaigns  grew  and  led  to  more  sales  (about  200,000 
shares  per  year)  as  early  as  the  1930s.  A  second  category  of  special  plans  aimed  to  convert 
employees into shareholders. A study cited by Berle and Means estimates that more than 800,000 
employees became shareholders  through  these plans between 1900 and 1930  roughly. Today, we 
know  such  plans  as  employee  stock  purchase  plans,  and  large  public  corporations  still  offer 
employees  an  option  to  receive  a  substantial  portion  of  their  compensation  in  shares  of  the 
company,  or  to  buy  shares  in  the  company  cheaply.  Although  they  have  experienced  episodic 
popularity,  these  two  categories  of  plans  have  contributed  to  promoting  shareholding  to  the 
investing public and to increasing its participation in financial markets.  
iv) The evolution of political and legal institutions  
While  economic  factors,  such  as  industrial  development  and  the  emergence  of  financial 





politicians  in  response  to  contestations  by  various  interest  groups  (notably  managers  and  small 
business) in the first half of the 20th century. The main thrust of Roe’s argument is that politics led to 
the  fragmentation  of  finance  in  America.  Barriers  were  erected  to  curb  the  power  of  financial 
institutions  and  to  prevent  institutional  investors  from  buying  large  blocks  of  stock20.  Banks, 
insurance  companies,  mutual  funds  and  pension  funds  were  all  repeatedly  barred  through  rule‐
making from owning large enough stakes to be able to provide oversight to corporate managers21. 
Rooting his  analysis  in  chaos  theory,  path dependence  and modern  evolution  theory,  Roe 
explains why the US was put on the path of fragmented local finance rather than centralized finance, 
even though it seems evident that the US could today “absorb large‐scale finance”22. Roe traces back 
the origins of  the American  financial  system  to US president Andrew  Jackson’s destruction of  the 




vs.  decentralized  system,  but  was  rather  more  a  reaction  to  populist  sentiment  that  feared 
concentration of wealth and the power that this wealth could exert over Congress. More specifically, 
Jackson’s  politics  favored  an  “agricultural  republic”,  and  the  Bank  was  thought  to  improve  the 




suited  system  to  survive  a  downturn  was  a  “relatively  fragmented  financial  system  of  federally‐
guaranteed  commercial  banks with  local  branches”24.  According  to  Roe,  the  current US  economic 
system  is  not  necessarily  the  most  efficient  outcome,  especially  considering  the  lack  of  a  direct 
contest  between  the  centralized  vs.  decentralized  alternatives25,  but  rather  the  product  of  path 
dependence stemming from politically‐charged past decisions. 
However,  the  corollary  to  fragmented  finance  and  lack  of  presence  of  strong  financial 
institutions  is  the  development  in  the  US  of  “substitutes”  to  the  active  role  of  banks  in  other 
countries,  including strong capital markets but also a  relatively sophisticated  legal environment26. 
Roe cites a few of these institutions: the well‐defined fiduciary duties of board directors, an “active 








In  the  corporation,  three  core  agents  shape  a  corporation’s  “focus,  direction,  productivity 
and  competitiveness,  and  ultimately  viability  and  legitimacy”:  Managers,  Directors  and 
Shareholders28. 
• Managers  are  essentially  responsible  for  supplying  management  to  the  firm.  More 
specifically,  they  are  in  charge  of  day‐to‐day  operations  of  the  firm  towards  meeting  its 
corporate objectives. They are selected, compensated and can be removed by directors. 
 
• Directors  have  two  key  functions:  management  and  monitoring29.  Management  tasks 




shareholders  have  reserved  certain  powers  for  themselves  through  special  acts.  Directors 
can  delegate  some  of  their  powers  either  to  other  board members  or  committees  (intra‐
board‐delegation)  or  to  non‐director  managers  (extra‐board  delegation)33,  except  when 









3. Right  to  bring  suit  for  damages  if  the  corporation’s  directors  or  managers  fail  to 
meet their obligations,  
4. Right to receive certain information from the company 




of  incorporation37.  The  right  to  receive  a  dividend  is  also  frequently  cited  as  a  key 
shareholder right, although this right relates only to declared dividends. While management 






of  the  firm.  That  said,  UCLA  professor  Lynn  Stout  adds  an  interesting  layer  to  our 
understanding when she notes that, strictly speaking, “none of the three phrases commonly 
used  to  describe  shareholders’  relationship  to  the  public  corporation  […]  is  factually 
correct”38.  First,  as  to  ownership,  Stout  comments:  “Corporations  are  independent  legal 
entities  that  own  themselves;  shareholders  own  only  a  security,  called  ‘stock’,  with  very 
limited legal rights”39. To this same point, UCLA professor Stephen Bainbridge also adds that 
if  the  corporation  is  in  fact  a  ‘nexus  of  contracts’,  it  is  not  a  thing  that  can  be  owned  by 
shareholders  in  any  meaningful  way40.  Second,  as  to  the  principal‐agent  problem,  Stout 
states:  “At  law,  a  principal  has  a  right  to  control  his  agent.  Directors  are  not  agents  but 
fiduciaries  largely  insulated  from  shareholders’  control,  and  they  owe  duties  not  just  to 
shareholders  but  also  to  the  firm  as  a whole”41.  Finally,  as  to  residual  claims,  Stout  notes 
that employees, creditors and stakeholders can also have residual claims to the corporation. 
However,  recent  developments  in  corporate  law  have  established  a  variety  of  other 
stakeholders  as  key  actors whose  interests must  also  increasingly  be  considered  and protected  in 
the corporate governance process: 
• Stakeholders  are  other  agents  who  contribute  different  assets  to  the  corporation  and  to 
which  managers  and  directors  may  owe  duties.  They  include,  but  are  not  limited  to, 
creditors,  employees,  customers,  suppliers,  as  well  as  the  environment  and  society  as  a 
whole.  For  example,  creditors,  like  shareholders,  supply  finance  to  the  firm,  while 
employees  contribute  labour.  Stakeholders  may  have  contractual  relations  with  the 
corporation  and may  benefit  from protections  from wrongdoing  or  opportunism by  other 
agents in the corporate triad. 












Indeed,  the  leitmotiv  of  their  work  was  to  illustrate  that  the  modern  corporation  is 
characterized by a concentration of power  in  the “control” class  (suppliers of management) and a 








time, beneficial  ownership  is  centrifugal,  tending  to divide  and  subdivide,  to  split  into ever  smaller 
units  and  to  pass  freely  from hand  to  hand.  In  other words,  ownership  continually  becomes more 
dispersed;  the  power  formerly  joined  to  it  becomes  increasingly  concentrated;  and  the  corporate 
system is thereby more securely established”45. 
Berle  and  Means  show  that  between  1900  and  1930,  the  number  of  shareholders  grew 
rapidly, leaping from 400K to 20M book shareholders for a basket of 30 representative companies. 
The  size  of  ownership  blocks  started  decreasing,  with  the  largest  shareholder  of  most  of  these 
companies (such as General Electric and Western Union) already owning less than 3% of shares. 
With ownership units becoming ever smaller, it becomes increasingly complex to bond them 




costly  for owners  to exercise  control over  their wealth. Thus,  the outcome of  this  scenario  is  that 
owners  will  in  effect  surrender  control  to  suppliers  of  management,  who  will  be  chartered  with 
managing their wealth on their behalf: 
“The  surrender  of  control  over  their  wealth  by  investors  has  effectively  broken  the  old  property 
relationships and has raised the problem or defining these relationships anew” 
While  this  surrender  of  control  does  present  some  efficiency  gains  (in  that  qualified 
managers  become  responsible  for  administering  the  property),  the  result  of  this  surrender  is  a 
power dynamic where owners/shareholders become relatively powerless. 
“The  separation  of  ownership  and  control  has  become  virtually  complete.  The  bulk  of  the  owners 
have in fact no control over the enterprise, while those in control hold only a negligible proportion of 
total ownership”46. 
To  be  sure,  not  all  modern  corporations  are  in  the  image  of  the  Berle  and  Means 
corporation. The ownership structures of the modern corporation fall on a spectrum between two 
poles: 
• Widely‐held  corporations,  also  called  managerially‐controlled  corporations,  “do  not  have 
one shareholder owning a sufficient amount of stock to have working control of the firm”47. 
There is complete separation of ownership and control. 
• Controlled  corporations  have a dominant  shareholder who can  control  voting.  In majority‐
controlled  firms,  the  dominant  shareholder  owns  50%  or  more  of  the  shares,  while  in 
minority‐controlled  firms  the  dominant  shareholder  owns  less  than  50%  yet  still  controls 
voting48. 






De‐Silanes  and  Shleifer  concluded  that  80%  of  large US  firms were widely‐held  (using  a  stiff  20% 
control cutoff), while only 50% of  firms  in Canada were widely‐held50. This  is an  interesting result, 
since one could assume that most, if not all, of the largest corporations would be widely‐held. As far 
as  controlled  firms,  they count  for 56%  in Canada but only 25%  in  the US51. This  illustrates a very 
different, almost opposite, ownership landscape between the two countries who nevertheless share 
both physical proximity and ideological proximity at the corporate law level. 
Indeed,  the  US‐style  “Berle  and  Means”  big  public  corporation  is  far  from  a  universal 
stereotype, and perhaps even in the minority worldwide. The influential empirical research from the 
team of economists and legal scholars from Harvard, Tuck and EDHEC composed of La Porta, Lopez‐
De‐Silanes  and  Shleifer  has  shown  in  great  detail  that  corporate  ownership  structures  vary 
significantly across countries. In Corporate Ownership Around the World, they show through a study 
of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies that “relatively few of these firms were widely‐held, 
in contrast  to  the Berle and Means’  image of ownership of  the modern corporation”52.   The study 
rather  shows  that  around  the world,  a  high  percentage  of  firms  are  controlled  by  families  or  the 
State.  Family‐controlled  corporations  are  notably  also  quite  prevalent  in  Canada  and  in  small  and 
medium corporations in the USA. In their 2006 study examining 487 Canadian companies, University 
of  Montreal  scholars  Rousseau,  Bozec  and  Laurin  show  that  concentrated  ownership  is  also 






based  approach  to  governance  thus  remains  pertinent  independent  of  ownership  structure. 






















• Managerial  discretion: Managers,  directors  and other  Insiders  are  able  to manage 
the  firm  without  meaningful  intervention  of  Outsiders.  This  pole  is  also  called 
“director discretion”. 
• Shareholder  power:  Outside  shareholders  have  meaningful  intervention  ability  to 
review  Insider  behaviour.  This  pole  is  also  sometimes  referred  to  as  “shareholder 
choice”, although shareholder power is necessarily the larger umbrella concept56. 
There is consensus in scholarship that a well‐governed firm requires a healthy dose of both 
managerial  discretion  and  shareholder  power. Managers  need  flexibility  to meet  business  needs, 
while  investors  accept  to  finance  the  firm  only  if  they  can  expect  something  back.  That  said,  too 





together  the  concepts  of  ownership  structure  and  the  resulting  power  equilibrium.  Widely‐held 
firms, by definition, have a dispersed ownership base  that often gives  little other  choice  than  the 







scale  or  equilibrium  in  their  favour  to  address  particular  legitimate  business  risks  or  concerns. 







1. Manager  opportunism  /  Vertical:  Conflicts  between  managers  and  directors,  and 
shareholders. This type of opportunism is most prevalent in widely‐held firms. 
2. Inter‐shareholder  opportunism  /  Horizontal:  Conflicts  between  controlling  and  minority 
shareholders. This type of conflict is most prevalent in controlled firms. 
3. Opportunism vis‐à‐vis other stakeholders 
Like  Kraakman  and  Rousseau,  we  will  constrain  our  analysis  to  the  two  first  types, 
understanding that disputes involving stakeholders are in many ways a separate category of conflicts 








of  one  party,  termed  the  principal,  depends  upon  actions  taken  by  another  party,  termed  the 





to perform some service on  its behalf which  involves delegating some decision making authority  to 
the agent.  If both parties  in  the  relationship are utility maximizers,  there  is  good  reason  to believe 
that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal”61.  
This work  from  Jensen  and Meckling  sits  on  the  shoulders  of  pioneering  scholarship  from 
Nobel laureate Ronald Coase. In 1937, Coase defined the firm, in his paper The Nature of the Firm, as 
a  legal  fiction  serving  as  a  “nexus  of  contracts”,  thus  establishing  “contractual  relations  as  the 
essence of the firm”62.  
Harvard  professor  Michael  Jensen  posits  that  agency  costs  apply  to  many  types  of 







Principals  can  try  to  align  their  interests  closely  with  those  of  their  agents.  As  Kraakman 
notes, “reducing agency costs is in the interests of all parties in a transaction, principals and agents 
alike”66. The principal accomplishes this through tools like compensation, reporting and supervision: 









Jensen points  out  that  the  general  framework of  agency  relationships  and  agency  costs  is 
clearly applicable to conflicts in the modern corporation: 
“Since  the  relationship  between  the  shareholders  and  the  managers  of  a  corporation  fits  the 
definition  of  a  pure  agency  relationship,  it  should  come  as  no  surprise  to  discover  that  the  issues 
associated  with  the  ‘separation  of  ownership  and  control’  in  the  modern  diffuse  ownership 
corporation are intimately associated with the general problem of agency”69. 
Building  on  the  Jensen  view  of  general  agency  problems  in  the  modern  corporation, 
Grossman and Hart, as well as others70, qualified the benefits that can be extracted by managers as 
the “private benefits of control”71. 
Harvard  economist Oliver Hart,  and  later  Vishny  and  Schleifer,  add  an  interesting  layer  of 
analysis by developing the concept of “control” and “ownership” rights. Hart assesses that external 
financing  is  a  “contract  between  the  firm  as  a  legal  entity  and  the  financiers,  which  gives  the 
financiers certain rights vis‐à‐vis the assets of the firm”72. In other words, outside investors agree to 
finance  on  the  condition  that  they  receive  what  Hart  calls  “control  rights”,  the  most  important 
component  of which  are  voting  rights73.  Few  investors would  invest without  any  control  rights  to 
allow them to enforce their rights. These control rights accompany the ownership or cash‐flow rights 
that  come  as  a  by‐product  of  shareholding.  As  we  recall  from  Berle  and  Means  in  relation  to 
economic rights, shareholders are those individuals “to whom profits go”. 
Vishny  and  Schleifer  determine,  in  perhaps  the  most  salient  way  for  the  purpose  of  this 
paper, that conflicts arise between agents in the corporate triad when “control”/”voting” rights do 
not accrue proportionately to “ownership”/”cash‐flow” rights74. 







Corporate  governance  academics  have  developed  a  relatively  well‐defined  list  of  conflict 





more  granularity  specific  types  of  corporate decisions.  Kraakman distinguishes  between  “general” 








frequently  in  the  normal  course  of  business  activity,  like  nominating  or  replacing  directors  and 
selecting governance arrangements. 















“That  corporate  governance  provokes  political  debate  should  not  surprise  us.  Corporate 
governance—the  authority  structure  of  a  firm—lies  at  the  heart  of  the  most  important  issues  of 
society. That authority structure decides who has claim to the cash flow of the firm, who has a say in 
its  strategy  and  its  allocation  of  resources.  As  such,  corporate  governance  affects  the  creation  of 




endowments  of  orphanages  and  hospitals,  the  claims  of  the  rich  and  the  poor.  It  creates  the 
temptations for cheating and the rewards for honesty, inside the firm and more generally in the body 
politic. […] 
It  is  no  wonder  then,  that  corporate  governance  provokes  conflict.  Anything  so  important  will  be 
fought over. Anything  that  shapes wealth,  opportunities,  stability,  and  corruption  is  sure  to  attract 
the  concerns  of  the  powerful  and  provoke  the  anxiety  of  the  weak.  Everyone  has  a  stake  in  the 
corporate governance system, and everyone has an interest in how it is structured”.78  
The  importance  of  corporate  governance  also  reveals  itself  in  the  positive  correlation 
between  good  governance  and  firm  valuation.  In  their  paper  Investor  Protection  and  Corporate 
Valuation, La Porta and colleagues find that “consistent with theory, better shareholder protection is 
empirically  associated  with  higher  valuation  of  corporate  assets”,  as  measured  by  Tobin’s  Q79.  A 
recent article in the McKinsey quarterly noted that “over eighty percent of investors surveyed stated 
that  they would pay more  for  the  shares of a well  governed company  than  for a poorly governed 
firm of comparable financial worth”80. However, it must be noted that the empirical evidence of the 
causal link between better governance and higher firm value is mixed. 
That  said,  effective  governance  is  also  “essential  to  the  healthy  growth  of  capitalism  in  a 
democracy”81.  According  to  La  Porta,  strong  shareholder  protection  also  enables  the  rapid 
development of healthy financial markets. The La Porta study puts forward the following key thesis 
to explain how good corporate governance helps to stimulate the development of markets: 
“When  their  rights  are  better  protected  by  the  law,  outside  investors  are  willing  to  pay more  for 
financial assets such as equity and debt. They pay more because they recognize that, with better legal 
protection, more of the firm’s profits would come back to them as interest or dividends as opposed to 
being  expropriated  by  the  entrepreneur  who  controls  the  firm.  By  limiting  expropriation,  the  law 
raises the price that securities fetch in the marketplace. In turn, this enables more entrepreneurs to 
finance their investments externally, leading to the expansion of financial markets”82. 




Having understood  the  seminal  role  of  corporate  governance  to  diffuse  corporate  conflict 






for  themselves  a  return  on  their  investment.  While  US  and  Canada  provide  some  of  the  most 
comprehensive  shareholder  protections  in  the world, we  find  that  shareholders  still  lack  in many 















On  one  hand, mismanagement  is  possibly  the  most  basic  and  most  common  source  of 
shareholder  dissatisfaction.  Although  there  is  generally  no wrongdoing  in  a  legal  sense,  it  implies 
that Insiders are not acting to maximize the value of the firm, usually measured by stock price and 
shareholder  wealth.  Mismanagement  is  typically  synonymous  with  poor  performance  stemming 
from  inefficient  use  of  the  corporation’s  resources,  especially  in  the  presence  of  more  viable 
alternatives. Mismanagement  reduces  the  pie  of  corporate  value85.  Insiders mismanage  by  either 
inefficiently (1) “taking cash out” or (2) “keeping cash in”86. 
First,  for  “taking  cash out”  conflicts, waste  is  often  the by‐product. Wasteful  utilization of 
corporate resources is a source of conflict, since it deprives shareholders of profit streams that lead 
to  share  price  appreciation  and  increased  dividend  streams.  Waste  can  for  example  be  caused 
through  spending  in pet projects,  excess  generosity or  the pursuit  of  low NPV projects87. Another 
classic “take cash out” subcase is empire‐building, where Insiders can choose to expand inefficiently 
the size of the firm, often by buying assets, creating new divisions or making acquisitions, mainly or 
reasons  of  influence,  prestige,  perks,  job  security  or  to  gain  private  benefits  of  control.  This  is 
inefficient behaviour,  since  the  failure  to pursue higher NPV projects deprives shareholders of  the 
cash‐flows associated with those projects.  
Second, for “keeping cash in” conflicts, the problem is usually dividend withholding or cash 
hording.  Insiders  control  dividend  policy  and  have  the  power  to  not  distribute  profits  to 
  
20 
shareholders.  Conflicts  arise  when  the  corporation  withholds  dividends  and  retains  profits  even 
though it has a poor slate of positive NPV projects on the horizon, in which case it should distribute 
profits  to  shareholders  as  dividends.  This  situation  is  exacerbated  in  corporations  that  limit  or 
suppress other shareholder rights, since dividend payouts are often viewed as a substitute signal of 
efficient management, according to the substitution hypothesis of La Porta et al88. In their analysis of 
4,000  companies  across  the world,  they  find  that  stronger  shareholder  rights  reduce  the  need  to 






side,  firms  can  pay  dividends  because  (1)  they  believe  higher  payouts  will  lead  to  share  price 
appreciation, (2) they want to establish a reputation with shareholders, (3) dividends can minimize 
agency  costs  between managers  and  investors  (since managers  can,  through  the  dividend  policy, 
shift the debt‐to‐equity ratio to alter the respective risks of shareholders and debtholders, which will 
have  an  impact  on  the  long‐term  price  of  the  share  and  the  likelihood  of  bankruptcy90)  or  (4) 
pressure  for  distribution  is  exerted  by  shareholders  on management.  On  the  con  side,  firms  can 
choose not to pay dividends for a few reasons: (1) it sends a negative signal to the market (that the 
firm has  run out of NPV projects),  (2) dividends are  irrelevant  since  shareholders  can  “make  their 
own dividends” (as explained in the classic papers by Nobel winners Modigliani and Miller91), (3) the 






“Agents  […] will  shirk  their  responsibilities,  if  given half a  chance.  In other words,  if not  sufficiently 
monitored, they will not work as hard as they should, take too many breaks or behave selfishly, lazily 






























With  generic  self‐dealing,  “the  law’s  concern  is  that  an  influential  director  or  officer  will 
transact with the company on terms less favourable [to the corporation] than could be obtained by 






assets  from/to  the  corporation  and  debt  guarantees  by  the  corporation100.  It  can  result  in  unfair 




  Pay‐for‐performance  is  a  key  incentive  used  to  motivate  executive  management. 
Compensation  is  also  a  form  of  self‐dealing,  albeit  “less  suspect”  since  it  is  commonplace  and 
necessary  for  the  well‐functioning  of  the  corporation102.  It  is  indeed  a  powerful  way  to  reduce 
agency  costs  and  to  align  the  incentives  of  managers  with  the  interests  of  the  corporation.  US 













In  the  corporation,  compensation  is  set  through  arms‐length  bargaining  between  two 
parties: directors and managers107. More specifically, managers negotiate a compensation contract 
with the company’s compensation committee, a subset of the board of directors typically composed 
of  3  or  4  directors.  In  this  context,  directors  represent  the  interests  of  the  corporation  and  of 
shareholders, who generally do not intervene in the compensation‐setting process: 






over  directors,  to  obtain  pay  that  is  disproportionately  superior  to  their  performance.  This  way, 
managers  obtain  compensation  “more  favorable  than  they  would  get  under  arm’s  length‐
bargaining”110 and which cannot be justified solely by regular bargaining power or by their  level of 




achieved  through  a  variety  of  compensation mechanisms  in  order  to  construct  a  pay  that  is  less 
sensitive  to  performance112.  Second,  Insiders  use  camouflage  to  make  the  rent  extraction  in 
compensation  less  transparent  to  scrutinizing  shareholders or outside parties. Bebchuk notes:  “To 
avoid  outrage,  compensation  designers  attempt  to  hide,  obscure  or  justify  –  in  other  words,  to 
‘camouflage’ the amount or form of executive pay”113.  
As Bebchuk also advances, rents come in many forms114.  There are at least 3 main forms of 
compensation  that  can be used  for  incentive  alignment,  but  can  also be  abused  for  opportunistic 
goals:  (1)  non‐equity  compensation  (ie.  salary,  bonus  and  perks),  (2)  stock  options  plans,  and  (3) 






perks.  Bebchuk  argues  that  bonuses  often  reward  other  elements  than managerial  performance, 
which  are  not  controlled  by managers  (ie.  good  performance  in  the  sector  of  the  company),  and 
further  encourage managers  to  set  low  goals  in  order  to  exceed  them116. Managers  also  receive 
other forms of discretionary bonuses, like “golden hellos” upon hiring and acquisition bonuses. Both 
bonus  types  usually  have  little  correlation  with  actual  performance  of  the  manager  in  the 
corporation.  Managers  also  receive  corporate  perquisites  (perks),  which  are  in  some  cases 
extravagant. In the past, executives also received additional pay via executive loans (either through 
low  rates,  lax  repayment  terms  or  loan  forgiveness)  and  split‐dollar  life‐insurance  policy.  Both 
practices have however been prohibited or strongly curbed in the last few years117. 
Second,  conventional  equity‐based  stock  option  plans  often  make  up  the  bulk  of  the 
compensation of managers, but are also prone to abuse when controlled or influenced by managers. 




However,  Bebchuk  summarizes  the  dangers  of  equity‐based  compensation  as  such:  “The 
huge gains from options for below‐average performers should give pause to even the most ardent 
defender of current corporate pay systems”118.  
There  are  a  number  of  general  objections  to  why  stock‐option  plans  might  not  serve 
shareholders, such as: (1) concentration power, (2) downward insensitivity, (3) inability to filter large 
windfalls,  and  (4)  unwinding  freedom.  First,  stock‐option  plans  in  general  have  the  power  to 
concentrate too many options (especially considering decreasing marginal utility) in too few hands. 
It  is  questionable whether highly  incentivizing  a  few people  is  the most  efficient use of  resources 
than  more  broad‐based  corporate  compensation  schemes119.  Second,  stock  options  as  a  vehicle 
















Stock  options  are  also  very malleable  and  flexible,  a  feature  which  is  sometimes  used  in 
option plan design to create plans that skew benefits  towards managers, such as with these three 
common practices: (1) At‐the‐money option pricing, (2) Repricing and backdoor repricing, (3) Reload 
features.  First,  at‐the‐money  option  pricing  is  the  default  arrangement  in  the  majority  of 
corporations and sets the strike price equal to the stock price, while an out‐of‐the‐money option has 
a higher strike price. An out‐of‐the‐money option would more tightly couple pay with performance, 
since gains would be possible only when  the  stock price  rises on  the manager’s watch. An at‐the‐
money option provides a payout to the manager for the passage of time, since stock prices tend to 
generally  rise  over  time122.  According  to  Bebchuk,  even  though  out‐of‐the‐money  options  are 
cheaper to issue and empirical evidence has shown them to be effective to boost firm value123, 95% 
of  firms  still  use  at‐the‐money  options.  Second,  with  repricing,  managers  are  able  to modify  the 
strike price of their options ex‐post grant, by cancelling the old options and issuing new options with 
a  lower  strike  price.  Bebchuk  cites  a  study  to  the  effect  that  out  of  802  repricings,  800  aimed  to 
lower the strike price, with an average strike price decrease of 39%124. The logic of repricing is that 
general market losses or one‐time market shocks may have significantly reduced the share price. In 
these  cases,  executive  with  worthless  or  strongly  “underwater”  options  may  not  have  sufficient 
incentive  to  carry  forward  managing  the  affairs  of  the  corporation  with  a  view  to  maximizing 
shareholder  value. Worse  yet, managers may  gain  a  perverse  bet‐the‐farm  type mentality. While 
repricing does provide a clean slate or a second chance, “ex‐post repricing does undermine ex‐ante 
incentives” and rewards managerial failure.125 Although this practice has been curbed by accounting 
standards126,  backdoor  repricing  achieves  the  same  result.  Third,  reload  features  allow managers 
who  exercise  their  options  to  receive  not  only  the  underlying  stock,  but  also  a  new  option.  This 




can provide  substantial  pay  to  executives  after  they  leave  the  company.  The decoupling  between 
pay  and  performance  is  therefore  particularly  strong,  often  making  exit  compensation  a  quite 
contentious  issue.  Three  events  typically  trigger  such  pay:  (1)  Firing,  (2)  Major  transactions 




board, directors  are often  reluctant  to  fire even a poor‐performing CEO.  Instead,  they will  offer  a 
gratuitous payment, often above and beyond what  the severance package promises contractually, 
that  acts  as  a  “bribe  to  secure  cooperation”129.  Except  in  cases where  the CEO  is  fired  ‘for  cause’ 






and  push  the  deal  through  by  sweetening  the  deal  for  managers.  Directors  can  accomplish  this 
either  through  “golden  parachute  boosting”  or  “golden  goodbyes”131,  even  if  they  are  not 
contractually obligated  to and even  if  the goal  is ultimately  to  replace  the CEO. Bebchuk qualifies 
these bonuses, which are paid out cash in 40% of  large acquisitions, as a “reward for overseeing a 
transaction”132. Third, CEO and managers often receive generous retirement advantages that often 
go  largely  beyond  what  was  convened  under  arms‐length  bargaining.  This  retirement  pay  can 












A  classic  case  that  illustrates  appropriation  is  Guth  v.  Loft136,  where  the  president  and 
director  of  Loft  (a  retailer  of  food,  candy  and  syrups)  acquired  effective  control  of  the  Pepsi‐Cola 
Corporation  for  his  personal  profit  without  first  giving  Loft  the  chance  to  acquire  Pepsi137.  The 
director  then  made  things  worse  by  carrying  on  a  “clandestine  program”  to  develop  Pepsi 
commercially  using  “Loft  funds,  facilities  and  employees”138.  In  later  jurisprudential  development, 
the Delaware court developed a  test  that can be used  to help qualify whether or not  the director 
must present the opportunity to the corporation: “(1) Is the corporation financially able to take the 
opportunity?  (2)  Is  the opportunity  in  the  corporation’s  line of business,  (3) Does  the  corporation 
have  an  interest  in  the  opportunity?  (4)  Does  a  director  have  a  conflict  of  interest  by  taking  the 
opportunity for himself”139. 
The court developed a similar yet different structured test to appreciate misappropriation in 
practice  in  Gravino  v.  Enerchem  Transport  Inc140.  In  this  case,  two  ex‐officers  of  marine 






summarizes  the key  factors  considered  in  the  four‐prong  test developed by  the  court  to  interpret 
misappropriation:  “(1) the  degree  to  which  the  interests  of  the  director  and  the  interests  of  the 




emergence  of  the  business  opportunity  and  its  exploitation  and  (4) the  proximity  in  character 
between the business opportunity pursued by the company and the contract or business concluded 
by the director  for his own profit or  the profit of a  third party”142.  In Gravino,  the court  illustrates 




the  corporation,  but  rather  usurp  “the market  value  of  the  company’s  investments  from  outside 
shareholders ”144.  Insider trading  implies “trading  in securities while  in possession of material non‐
public information”145.  
Let’s  take  a  look  at  a  few  components  of  this  definition.  First,  materiality  is  found when 
there  is  a  “substantial  likelihood  that  a  reasonable  investor  would  consider  the  omitted  fact 
important  in deciding whether  to buy or  sell  securities”146.  The  timing of  the materiality  is  also of 
critical  importance147. Second, as  for  the non‐public aspect,  information  is considered to enter  the 
public  domain when  the  news  could  be  “expected  to  appear  over  the  Dow  Jones  ticker  tape”148. 
Material news of  lesser  importance  is still considered non‐public until widely‐released, even  if  it  is 
not  via  the  tape.  The  aim  of  this  restriction  is  to  provide  something  akin  to  equal  access  to 
information  for  all  parties,  either  inside  or  outside  the  corporation.  Third,  insider  trading  is 
applicable  not  only  to  ‘classic  insiders’  (directors  and  officers),  but  also  to  ‘constructive  insiders’ 
(legal counsel, underwriters, accountants, consultants) and possibly to other parties149. 
Insider trading has negative repercussions for shareholders. First,  insider trading can divert 
profits  from  shareholders  to  Insiders,  especially  if  the  shareholder  is  on  the  other  side  of  a 
transaction involving an asymmetrically better informed Insider. Insider trading can thus be unfair to 
shareholders  since  it  generally  puts  them  in  a  situation  of  inferiority  in  terms  of  access  to 
information.  Second,  it  can  hurt  the  confidence  of  investors  in  public  capital markets150.  Third,  as 
described by Easterbrook, the ability to carry out insider trading can create a perverse incentive for 
managers  to  choose  often  riskier  projects  that  create  short‐term  fluctuations  in  the  stock  price, 
while shareholders bare the cost of the eventual failure of these projects151. 
It should however also be noted that some scholars have proposed an interesting contrarian 
position  that  insider  trading  actually  benefits  the  corporation.  Manne’s  two‐pronged  argument 
summarizes  well  this  perspective.  First,  insider  trading  can  increase  price  accuracy,  since  stock 
purchases will move the stock towards the efficient price incorporating the new information into the 
price.  Second,  insider  trading  can  provide  a  way  to  compensate  managers  for  creating  valuable 








Major  corporate  transactions  include  two  smaller  subcategories:  significant  corporate 
actions  and  control  transactions.  Significant  corporate  actions  include mergers,  substantial  sale  of 






large value relative to the company,  (2)  it  requires “broad gauge,  investment‐like  judgements  that 




at market  value156.  If  not,  the  board  preserves  authority  and  discretion  to  carry  out  transactions 
independently157. 







many situations, directors have self‐interested  incentives to not always act  in the best  interests of 
shareholders159. As a result, shareholders may not obtain the value‐maximizing outcome (highest bid 
price  from  acquirer).  Also,  corporate  resources  have  a  higher  probability  of  being  diverted  from 
shareholders to directors.  
Since major corporate transactions like takeovers are “structural”, “final‐period” or “game‐




to  market  discipline  because  the  target  by  definition  will  no  longer  operate  in  the  market  as  an 
independent agency”160. 




Therefore, directors may  refuse  to co‐operate  for a  few reasons:  (1) Retention of position 
and  perks,  (2)  Hold‐out  for  higher  price  for  the  transactions  or  (3)  Hold‐out  for  side‐payments162. 
Example  of  side‐payments  include:  “equity  stakes  in  the  surviving  entity,  employment  or  non‐




Conflicts  in  major  transactions  also  often  tend  to  gravitate  around  the  price  of  the 
transaction, especially as to whether it is fair or not. In takeovers, successful bids typically generate 




According  to  Kraakman,  some  of  the  other  risks  of  significant  corporate  actions  are  asset 
looting, dilution and minority  abuse  (by altering  the  characteristics of  a  shareholder’s  investment, 
possibly without his approval)168. In the case of minority abuse, the minority shareholder may face a 
prisoner’s dilemma compelling him to sell shares too cheaply and thus be cheated out of obtaining a 
“negotiated control premium”, especially when  the buyer uses open market purchases  to  secretly 
acquire  control  (minority  discount)169,  or  he  may  find  his  liquidity  to  exit  greatly  reduced 
(marketability discount)170. Issuances of shares are another form of major transaction, which creates 








may  lead  to  the  conflicts  explored  in  the  previous  section.  Furthermore,  as  the  last  decade’s 
corporate  governance  scandals  have  shown,  the  “rampant  wrongdoing”  was  not  confined  to  a 
particular company, sector, geography, jurisdiction or legal tradition. Rather, several enabling factors 
have permitted this power capture by Insiders and the perpetuation of conflicts over time.  
We separate  three types of sources of power:  (1)  Internal Governance,  (2) Regulatory and 




environment  rather  than  a  direct  result  of  Insider  action.  Third,  several  market  factors  also 
strengthen Insider power.  
 While  internal  mechanisms  mostly  lead  to  entrenchment  by  Insiders,  regulatory 
mechanisms rather confer discretion to Insiders. In summary, all three types of mechanisms lead to 
power  capture  by  Insiders,  which  enable  entrenchment  and  discretion,  which  then  leads  to 
scenarios of opportunism and conflict. 
2.2.1 Internal Governance Mechanisms 





related,  key  aspects  of  the  corporation:  (1)  Elections  and  (2)  Compensation.  Insiders  can  use  this 
influence  to  capture  power  and perpetuate  opportunistic  behavior, without much  real  opposition 
potential from shareholders. 










Bebchuk  argues  that  this  safety  valve  is  a  necessary  component  to  align  the  interests  of 
shareholders  and  Insiders.  Even  putting  aside  the  lofty  goals  of  increased  ‘shareholder  voice’, 
‘shareholder  power’  or  ‘representative  corporate  democracy’,  Bebchuk  argues  that  the  right  to 
replace directors  is  essential  for  accountability  and effective  corporate  governance.  The Delaware 
Supreme  Court  in Unocal  agrees,  recalling  that  “shareholder  displeased  with  the  actions  of  their 
elected representatives have the powers of corporate democracy at  their power”173. Furthermore, 
Delaware  has  vigorously  rebutted  any  attempt  to  “unduly  interfere  with  the  shareholder 




as  they  stay  on  the  management  slate  put  forth  in  the  proxy176.  Shareholders  face  a  number  of 
barriers  separating  them  from  real  ability  to  contest,  notably  the  difficulty  of  accessing  the  proxy 
machinery to propose their own director choices. Shareholders are not able to propose candidates 
on  the same proxy as management, and must circulate materials and solicit proxies on  their own. 
Further  difficulties  lie  in  collective  action  problems,  legal  hurdles,  power  asymmetry  (especially 





For  example,  between  1996  and  2002,  contested  elections  occurred  215  times  (but  in  only  80 
companies  out  of  the  thousands  of  public  companies),  and  numbered  about  30  per  year179.  Only 
about  2  contests  per  year  out  of  those  30  occurred  in  companies with more  than  200 million  in 
market  cap,  so  it  appears  that  election  contests  were  particularly  infrequent  in  large  public 
companies180. Bebchuk summarizes his position as such: 
“The  shareholder  franchise  is  the  ideological underpinning upon which  the  legitimacy of directorial 
power rests.  […] But the safety valve  is missing. Although shareholder power to replace directors  is 
supposed  to  be  an  important  element  of  our  corporate  governance  system,  it  is  largely  a  myth. 
Attempts to replace directors are extremely rare, even in firms that systematically underperform over 
a  long period of  time. By and  large, directors nominated by  the company  run unopposed and  their 
election is thus guaranteed”181. 
Harvard  professor  and  ex‐dean  Robert  Clark  also  supports  Bebchuk’s  opinion  that 
shareholder voting rights in corporate elections are extremely weak: 
“A  cynic  could  easily  conclude  that  shareholder  voting  in  a  public  company  is  a  mere  ceremony 
designed to give a veneer of legitimacy to managerial power”182. 
As a consequence, the Board of directors becomes more like a self‐perpetuating body with a 
very  high  re‐election  rate  of  incumbents.  This  heightens  the  risk  of  stagnation,  homogeneity  and 






“There  is  a  link  between  managerial  power  and  pay.  The  more  power  managers  have,  the  more 
favorable their compensation arrangements are”183. 
To  explain  rent  extraction  in  the  compensation‐setting  process,  the  strongest  argument 
given  by  Bebchuk  and  Fried  relates  to  a  power  dynamic  where  directors  and managers mutually 
ensure their own survival via the election process. While directors are responsible for selecting and 
appointing  executive  managers,  managers  carry  reciprocally  vast  influence  on  the  director 
nomination  process184.  This  bilateral  appointment  scenario  ensures  that  both  parties  have  strong 
interests to collaborate collegiately, and possibly collude, to retain power. 
Since the position of corporate director carries great benefits (a median salary of $116K for 
the  top  1,000  US  companies,  in  addition  to  additional  perks,  prestige  and  valuable  social 
connections185),  directors  have  considerable  reason  to  want  to  be  re‐elected.  In  theory,  since 
directors are supposed to monitor management on behalf of the corporation and its shareholders, 
one  would  assume  that  “making  shareholders  happy”  would  be  paramount  for  a  director’s  re‐
election. In practice, shareholders have little if any involvement in director re‐election. Historically, 
as  Bebchuk  notes,  “candidates  placed  on  the  company’s  slate  […]  have  virtually  been  assured  of 
being reelected”186. Thus, it turns out that the reelection of directions is much more dependent on 
the benevolence of management  than  the  involvement of  shareholders. As Bebchuk notes,  “CEOs 
have had  considerable  and  sometimes decisive  influence over  the nominating process”,  citing  the 
role of CEOs sitting on nominating committees and the blocking power of CEOs. 
In addition to the central theme of power retention via elections, Bebchuk cites a number of 
other  economic  incentives,  as  well  as  psychological  factors  (such  as  collegiality,  friendship  and 
loyalty,  and  authority)  to  justify  why  managers  and  directors  prefer  not  have  fall‐outs  over  pay 
issues.  Furthermore,  short  of  outrage‐provoking  compensation  that  would  jeopardize  the 
reputations of  the parties  involved,  it would appear  that  there  is  little outside pressure  to heavily 
scrutinize  pay  contracts.  Courts  have  also  been  almost  unanimously  opposed  to  reviewing 
compensation arrangements, preferring to defer to managerial discretion187.  
In  the end, compensation contracts are often only  loosely negotiated. Since managers can 




Directors  can  also  be  relied  upon  to  approve  other  self‐dealing  transactions  (other  than 
executive  compensation),  which  can  provide  additional  compensation  and  private  benefits  to 
directors.  While  director  approval  can  be  an  effective  review  mechanism  for  self‐dealing 







the compensation packages of corporate officers191. However,  through corporate  law reforms,  the 
power of officers and board members to set their own compensation (as long as it is consistent with 
the  corporate  rules,  statutes  and  shareholder  agreements)  has  grown192.  Corporate  officers  now 
have considerable latitute to set their own compensation. That said, similarly to the US with SOX and 








do  Insiders have a high  level of  control over  their own proposals,  they also have  “partial  control” 
over the proposals of dissidents195.  
In  the  US,  such  Insider  advantages  include:  (1)  access  to  shareholder  lists,  (2)  access  to 
corporate resources, (3) bundling and packaging (4) timing and (5) vote tabulation. 
First,  Insiders have control over  the shareholder  list. Rule 14a‐7 states  that directors have 
the  choice  of  either  giving  access  to  the  shareholder  list  upon  request  or mailing  dissident  proxy 
materials  to shareholders  themselves196.  In practice,  Insiders choose to mail  the materials, so they 
can avoid disclosing the shareholder list and control the timing of the dissident mailing. While state 
law  in  the  US  may  provide  shareholders  a  right  to  inspect  the  corporate  shareholder  list  for  a 
“proper  purpose”197,  Insiders  can  contest  this  inspection  right  in  court,  which  will  cause  delays, 
increase legal costs for shareholders and reduce the list’s value198. 
Second,  Insiders  have  access  to  corporate  resources  to  defend  against  any  shareholder 




flipside,  dissident  shareholders  must  bare  their  own  costs.  The  corporation  has  no  obligation  to 
reimburse the expenses of the proposing shareholder, but may choose to do so (usually to bargain 
or  to  push  through  a  compromise,  which  many  not  be  in  the  shareholder’s  best  interest)201.  A 
corporation will  typically  reimburse  the dissident when the proposal aims  to  resolve a substantive 




Third,  Insiders  can  bundle  and  package  proposals  by  tying  together  a  bad  and  a  good 
proposal for shareholders203. Shareholders will need to vote on the combined proposal. Insiders can 
use this bundling of a good proposal  to make shareholders accept a bad proposal. As an example, 
Black  cites  Holiday  Corporation,  which  issued  a  large  one‐time  special  dividend  bundled  with  a 
revision to the corporate stock option plan that would greatly  increase executive compensation204. 
Insiders can also choose to split a proposal into smaller pieces across multiple proxy statements to 
increase  the  risk  each proposal will  be passed. As  an  example,  Insiders  could phase  anti‐takeover 
measures over multiple proxy statements205. As for packaging, Insiders can choose the optimal order 
of presentation that will maximize their chance of a successful vote. Insiders can choose to put more 
negative proposals at  the bottom of  the  list, knowing that  they would be more  likely  to get voted 
down if they were the first items on the list206. 
Fourth,  Insiders  have  timing  advantages.  Insiders  are  not  subjected  to  the  same 6‐month 
proposal  submission  requirement  as  shareholders.  This  affords  them  greater  latitude  to  make 
targeted  and  timely  proposals more  likely  to  garner  support.  Also,  shareholders  only  receive  the 
proxy  statement  about  one  month  before  the  meeting,  giving  them  little  time  to  organize  a 
dissidence, develop a proposal, lobby shareholders, receive SEC approval, submit the proposal to the 
company and/or send materials to shareholders207. On the flipside, the company will know 5 months 
ahead  of  time  the  nature  of  the  dissident  proposal,  leaving  them  with  ample  time  to  prepare 




in  and  withdraw  and  modify  in  mid‐vote  a  proposal  that  seems  likely  to  fail,  or  adjourn  the 
shareholder meeting to allow more time to gather support”209. While shareholders only learn of the 




states:  “It's  not  the  people  who  vote  that  count.  It's  the  people  who  count  the  votes”211. 
Furthermore, the lack of voting confidentiality also makes Insider vote tabulation more problematic. 
Except in those few companies who adopt confidential voting212, managers can use their insight into 
voting  results  to  lobby  or  re‐solicit  shareholders,  or  worse,  indirectly  reprimand  them  in  the 
future213. 
















different  contexts  of major  transactions.  He  distinguishes  between  two  types  of  transactions:  (1) 
statutory and (2) non‐statutory. In statutory transactions (like mergers and the sale of substantially 
all assets), the board’s approval is required. In non‐statutory transactions (tender offer, open market 
stock  purchases,  proxy  contests),  the  board’s  approval  is  not  required.  Of  course,  shareholder 
approval is usually required in both types of transactions216.  
In both statutory and non‐statutory transactions, the board may refuse to cooperate or seek 
to  intervene  to  preserve  its  private  benefits,  but  they  will  do  so  in  different  ways.  In  statutory 
transactions, since their approval is required, directors can simply refuse to cooperate, which will in 
itself  often  create  “insurmountable  barriers”  for  the  bidder217.  In  non‐statutory  transactions, 
directors will  need  to more proactively defend  their  private benefits  against  outside  attack.  Enter 








firms  had  staggered  boards  in  2002221.  Staggered  boards make  it  harder  to  replace  the  board  in 
either a proxy contest or a hostile takeover222 by dividing the board in a few classes (typically 3), with 
only a fraction of the board seats (typically 1/3) made renewable at every shareholder meeting. The 
raider  may  need  to  be  very  patient,  incur  significantly  larger  costs  due  to  the  delay,  and  wait  2 
annual shareholder meetings in order to eventually gain full board control223.  
According  to  Bebchuk,  90%  of  staggered  boards  are  implemented  through  a  charter 
provision, which requires both board and shareholder approval224 and cannot be later amended by 
shareholders  only.  The  other  10%  are  implemented  through  corporate  by‐laws  amendable  by 
shareholders, except in RMBCA states, which prohibit by‐law staggered boards altogether225. While 
staggered boards are increasingly included in corporate charters at IPO time (up from 34% in 1990 to 














and moreover  are  “correlated with  lower  firm  value”232.  Bebchuk  also  finds  staggered  boards  are 
“the  key  arrangement”  of  takeover  defenses  and  one whose  “effect  [on market  value]  is  several 
times  larger  than  the  average  effect  of  other  provisions”  in  a  index  of  corporate  governance 
measures233.  Yet,  he  also  concedes  that  the  potency  of  the  defense  standalone  is  only  mild  or 
weak234. The staggered board is most potent when combined with a poison pill in the “just‐say‐no” 
defense, which we will also examine in this section. 
On  the  downside,  staggered  boards  entrench management,  reduce  the  threat  of  removal 
and prevent  efficient  takeovers  that would  create  value  for  shareholders  (often  to  serve  the  self‐
interested motives of directors, like preservation of job and private benefits). On the upside, they do 
have the merit of helping directors to fetch larger acquisition premia through increased bargaining 




the  event  of  a  hostile  takeover”237,  typically  to  80%238.  The  aim  is  to  protect  against  “structurally 
coercive”239  two‐tier  offers  where  shareholders  are  offered  a  “higher  price  for  the  first  n  shares 
tendered than for the remaining ones”240. Two‐tier offers are  illegal  in many states, since they can 




Fair  price  amendments  are  a  “variant”241  of  the  super‐majority  amendment.  They  ensure 
that all the company shares are tendered at the same fair price. Insiders can thus reduce the threat 
of removal  from office with a  fair price amendment, since  it  further protects the company against 
swift hostile attacks. They were used in 25% of companies as of 1999242. 
Third,  poison  pills  allow  Insiders  to  “issue  more  voting  shares  at  a  low  price  to  existing 






rights  plan”245.  The  rights  are  attached  to  the  common  stock  but  become  exercisable  upon  the 
triggering  of  a  “distribution  event”  like  a  merger  or  acquisition  of  a  given  percentage  of  stock, 
typically 10‐20%246. Issuance of rights does not require shareholder approval247, so directors have in 
effect  substantial  discretion  to  craft  their  defense.  There  are  ‘flip‐over’  and  ‘flip‐in’  pills,  but both 
types can also be used  in  tandem. Development  in  the design of poison pills has been particularly 
rapid. Many new variants have evolved,  such as pills with  “back‐end plans”,  “poison debt”,  “dead 
hand” and “no‐hand” provisions. 
The poison pill often dooms the takeover attempt, leaving the raider with the sole remaining 
option  of  taking  control  of  the  board  to  rescind  the  pill  before  proceeding  with  the  takeover248. 
Redemption provisions are particularly  important to allow the board to rescind the pill  in order to 
proceed  with  an  efficient  transaction,  such  as  the  “window”  or  “white  knight”  provisions249. 
Redemption enforced through judicial means is highly improbable. In fact, Bebchuk cannot cite one 
case that “invalidates or requires the redemption of a standard poison pill”250. 
As  Bainbridge  states,  poison  pills must  also  be  protected  from  an  acquirer  coming  in  and 
either removing directors or adding directors (the “packing the board” strategy) by reserving to the 
board the power to determine its size251. 
A  less  used  variant  of  the  classic  poison  pill  is  the  “contractual”  poison  pill,  where  the 
takeover  target will  seek  to  attach  a  “change  of  control”  clause  to  important  corporate  contracts 





boards.  Rousseau  notes  that  the  “just  say  no  defense”  theoretically  is  the  “perfect”  takeover 
defense,  since  shareholders  will  not  sell  their  shares  to  the  acquirer  (the  pill  “blocks  stock 
acquisitions  beyond  the  trigger  level”253)  and  the  acquirer  cannot  quickly  replace  board members 
through proxy contests (the staggered board will only allow replacement of a fraction of the board 
at a given meeting),  leaving the acquirer with  little or no other alternatives than triggering the pill 
and  assuming  its  potentially  devastating  dilutive  consequences254.  This  defense  is  practically 
insurmountable, yet is still generally permitted in several key jurisdictions. In Delaware, the defense 
was allowed, even indefinitely, via the Time and Unitrin decisions255. 
Fifth,  golden  parachutes  can  be  used  as  a  takeover  defense  to  raise  the  price  of  the 
takeover attempt. Large compensation can be promised to target directors and officers in the event 








the  case  of  tin  parachutes). While  the  payoffs  of  golden  parachutes  and  stock  option  plans may 
better  motivate  directors  to  actively  consider  efficient  takeover  bids,  it  may  also  bring  them  to 
consider  inefficient  transactions  that  reduce  shareholder  wealth.  That  said,  Jensen  suggests  that 
golden parachutes  can be overall quite useful  in  takeover attempts  to  reduce  the agency  costs of 
directors  and  to  make  them  more  open  to  consider  takeover  offers.  The  proposed  severance 
package  in  the event of  a  transaction  (the golden parachute)  compensates directors  for  the  likely 
risk of job loss typically associated with a successful takeover258.  
Sixth,  Insiders  can  create  special  shareholding  structures  that  give  them disproportionate 
control rights relative to their cash flow rights. A special shareholding structure is one that deviates 
from the  standard arrangement of a  single  class of  common voting  stock applying  the  ‘one‐share, 
one vote’  rule, where  “voting power  is  in proportion  to economic  interest”259.  The general  idea  is 
that “an incumbent who cannot be outvoted […] cannot be ousted”260.  
According  to  Kraakman,  it  is  important  to  note  however  that  the  ‘one‐share,  one  vote’ 
rule261 is “widely accepted across jurisdictions […], and the dominant rule in the US and the UK”262, 
making it more difficult for directors to market these structures to shareholders. The structures are 
typically  created  at  inception  of  the  corporation  or  post‐IPO,  but  can  be  pushed  through  in  rarer 
cases at a  later time if  the dominant shareholder has a  large enough ownership block or coalition. 
Therefore,  the  conclusion  from Bozec,  Laurin et Rousseau  that Canadian  companies deviate more 
frequently  from  the  “one‐share  one‐vote  rule”  than  their  US  and  UK  counterparts  is  a  logical 
outcome given Canada’s more concentrated ownership structure263. 
The  result  is  what  Bebchuk  calls  “a  lock”  on  the  control  of  the  company  by  Insiders264. 




(CMS)  and  identifies  them as  a  separate  species of  ownership  that  does not  fall  on  the  identified 
spectrum  of  widely‐held  (here  called  dispersed  ownership:  DO)  or  controlled  firms  (here  called 
controlled  structures:  CS).    Bebchuk  warns  of  their  wicked  potential,  since  they  cumulate  the 
problems and agency costs of both ownership structures: 




These  special  structures  are  also  often  ripe  for  conflict,  since  they  create  high  private 






Multiple‐class  voting  structures  create  incentives  for  control  to  move  from  good  hands  to  bad 
because those who are willing to abuse control will often value it more than those who will not”266. 
Bebchuk  demonstrates  further  that  special  minority‐controlled  structures  lead  to  poor 
project  selection  (low  value,  but  high  private  benefits  of  control),    distorted  incentives  for  the 
controller  to  grow  the  corporation  inefficiently  large  (by  refusing  to  sacrifice  private  benefits  of 
control and not distributing profits to other shareholders), and inefficient transfers of control267. 
We will briefly examine the three prevalent special shareholding structures that Insiders use 
to  retain  control,  as  laid  out  by  Bebchuk,  Kraakman  and  Triantis:  (1)  Multi‐class  equity  with 
differential voting rights, (2) Pyramids, and (3) Cross‐ownership. 
First, the multi‐class equity structure with differential voting rights is perhaps the most basic 
special  shareholding  structure  and  the  only  type  not  to  require  creation  of  multiple  corporate 
entities. As Bebchuk notes, all that is needed is that “a planner attach all voting rights to the fraction 
of shares that are assigned to the controller, while attaching no voting rights to the remaining shares 
that  are  distributed  to  the  public  or  other  shareholders”268,  although  certain  restrictions may  be 
placed  on  the  voting  to  control  rights  ratio.  Bebchuk  cites  a  DeAngelo  study  showing  that  the 
median fraction of voting rights  for  Insiders was 57% with only 24% of the ownership rights269. An 
interest  variant  of  the  multi‐class  equity  structure  is  the  French  model,  where  some  companies 
gradually increase voting rights over time. Second, pyramids are created with only one class of stock 
when  “a  controlling minority  shareholder  holds  a  controlling  stake  in  a  holding  company  that,  in 
turn,  holds  a  controlling  stake  in  a  operating  company”270.  Through  this  vertical‐structure,  the 
minority  shareholder  can control  a  firm with a  small  fraction of ownership.  La Porta and Schleifer 
have determined  that pyramids are  the most  common  type of  special  shareholding  structure  that 
Insiders  use  to  retain  control271.  Third,  cross‐ownership  structures  are  conceived  so  that  “voting 
rights used to control a group remain distributed over the entire group rather than concentrated in 
the hands of a single company or shareholder”272. This horizontal structure was notably used by the 













break‐up  fees,  as well  as  the  following  defenses:  (4) White  Squire,  (5) White  Knight  and  (6)  Pac‐
Man276. 
First,  directors  of  the  target  board  can distribute away  to  shareholders  some  of  the  cash 
reserves that make the corporation such an attractive takeover target. Second, the target board can 
make  an  offer  to  repurchase  shares  of  the  corporation,  which  provides  shareholders  with  an 
alternative to the acquirer offer and allows Insiders to increase the size of the control block to better 
defend against  takeovers. Third, a break‐up fee  is “commonly paid to a prospective purchaser  if a 
contemplated  transaction  is  not  consummated  for  reasons  specified  in  the  purchase  agreement, 
including the seller’s acceptance of a competing bid”277. The target board can use break‐up fees with 
a  prefered  takeover  partner  to  dissuade  other  competing  bidders  from  taking  over  the  company. 
Fourth, the target board can seek to make a control alliance by  issuing a  large block to an outside 
partner,  a  white  squire,  who  will  not  seek  to  exert  control  over  the  corporation.  Directors 
accomplish this through a “stand‐still agreement”278. Fifth, the target board can choose to negotiate 
with  a white  knight  acquirer,  rather  than  a  hostile  acquirer, who  directors  think  is more  likely  to 
provide  value  for  shareholders  (or  who  may  be  more  likely  to  include  better  side‐benefits  for 






Overall,  despite  the  wide  variety  and  widespread  nature  of  several  of  the  defenses280,  it 
must also be noted that many states have anti‐takeover  laws prohibiting such methods of director 
entrenchment.  According  to  the Unocal281  test,  defensive  tactics  should  only  be  permitted  when 
they are “reasonable  in relation to the threat posed”282,  implying some form of economic analysis. 
The negative impact of permitting entrenchment via takeover defenses is seemingly justifed by the 
court’s  insistence  that  shareholders  have  the  power  to  replace  directors  with  others  directors 
proposing  alternative  defensive  measures.  That  said,  the  weakness  of  the  shareholder  franchise 
gives Insiders wide discretion to promote defenses that may not be truly in the shareholder’s favor. 
As for all takeover defenses, it is also important to remember that while many observers see 
them  to be  “against  shareholder  interests  and put  in  place by managers of  companies with weak 

















behalf  of  the  shareholder  principal,  and  is  thus  an  “inevitable  corollary  of  […]  the  separation  of 
ownership  and  control”286.  However,  this  discretion  should  not  be  used  to  make  selfish  or  self‐
interested decisions287. 
The  business  judgment  rule  also  theoretically  confirms  the  board  as  the  central  and  final 
decision‐making unit. The American Law Institute justifies the business judgment rule with the need 
to “encourage risk‐taking and innovation”288 by directors and officers.  





qualifies  for  judicial  deference.  As  Rousseau  reports,  the  American  Law  Institute  has  summarized 
this test: 
“A  director  or  officer  who  makes  a  business  judgement  in  good  faith  fulfills  the  duty  under  this 
Section if the director or officer: (1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgement, (2) is 
informed with respect to the subject of the business judgement to the extent the director or officer 
reasonably believes  to be appropriate under  the circumstances, and  (3)  rationally believes  that  the 
business judgement rule is in the best interest of the corporation”289. 
Bainbridge  comments  that  this  test  can  be  decomposed  in  a  number  of  pre‐conditions 
necessary  to  shield  the  director  from  litigation:  (1)  an  exercise  of  business  judgment,  (2) 
disinterested  decision‐making,  (3)  absence  of  fraud  or  illegality,  (4)  rationality,  (5)  an  informed 
decision‐making process. First,  the director who does not make a decision  is not protected by  the 
rule. Second, the director who is “subject to […] extraneous considerations or influences”290 and who 
cannot evaluate decisions on merit  is also not protected. Third, the director is not protected when 
decisions  are  “tainted  by  fraud,  illegality  or  self‐dealing”291.  Fourth,  the  director  is  not  protected 




not  question  further  if  the  decision  is  “equitable,  reasonable  or  wise”294.  As  famously  stated  in 
  
41 
Aronson vs. Lewis by the Delaware Supreme Court,  it  is not  the role of  the court  to "substitute  its 
own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment"295. 




to  review  by  the  courts.  The members  of  a  corporation  are  bound  by  its  constitution  and  cannot 
complain concerning decisions made by directors as a governing body within the general mandate of 
the  corporate  constitution.  They  directors  are  not  servants  to  obey  directions  given  by  the 





but  they  are  not  liable  for  simple  errors  of  business  of  judgement  that  they  may  make  in  the 
management  of  a  corporation.  Nor  will  the  courts  assist  the  shareholders  of  a  corporation  in 
restraining the directors from acting in what the directors considered to be in the best interest of the 
corporation”298. 
McGuiness  suggests  that  courts would  abstain  from  interference  as  a  general  rule,  unless 
one of  the  following  situations  is met:  (1) Directors are defrauding  the  corporation or  some of  its 
shareholders or (2) Directors are acting over their power or are causing the corporation to exceed its 
powers299. These exceptions are quite similar to those stated in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.300, one of 






long  as  the  decision  falls  within  a  range  of  reasonableness”302.  One  commentator  notes  that  the 
formulation  of  Canada’s  business  judgement  rule  in  Peoples  was  essentially  imported  from  US 
corporate  law,  in  that  it  gives  wide  discretion  but  not  free  reign  to  directors  in  their  decision‐
making303.  In the 2007 Kerr v. Danier Leather304 case, the Supreme Court also upholds the business 
judgement  rule,  while  giving  additional  insights  circumscribing  its  applicability,  this  time  in  the 
context  of  earnings  forecasts  to  be  included  by  Danier  in  their  prospectus  to  investors.  The 
prospectus is subject to mandatory disclosures under Ontario’s securities law. The court’s analysis is 
that  the  business  judgement  “would  not  have  relieved  Danier  from  its  obligation  to  disclose  a 
material  change”  and  that  “traditional  justifications  for  the  business  judgment  rule,  namely  the 
relative expertise of management and support for reasonable risk‐taking, do not apply to disclosure 














each  time.  Second,  given  the  variety  of  interests  that  exist  inside  the  ownership  base,  the  courts 
would not have the capacity to intervene to mediate all conflicts between shareholders.  
On  the  other  hand,  Rousseau  also  puts  forward  two  additional  competence‐related 
constraints that underlie  judicial deference. First, he argues that directors as a group are the most 
competent  body  to  take    corporate  decisions.  With  the  business  judgement  rule,  the  board  of 
directors  can  focus on making  the  right  decisions  for  the  firm without omnipresent  litigation  risk. 
This is key, he argues, since most decisions have a probability of loss, and most directors would be 






“A  trial  judge  […]  is dealing with  the matter at a different  time and place;  it  is unlikely  that he will 
have  the  background  knowledge  and  expertise  of  the  individuals  involved;  he  could  have  little  or 
knowledge of the background and skills of the persons who would be carrying out any proposed plan; 
and  it  is  unlikely  that  he  would  have  any  knowledge  of  the  specialized  market  in  which  the 








managers  or  directors  to  achieve  a  change311,  (2)  using  their  voting  power  to  enact  governance 
changes,  (3)  presenting,  or  threatening  to  present,  a  shareholder  proposal,  and  (4)  taking,  or 
threatening to take, legal action.  




few  or  no  other  agents  available.  Black  points  to  a  number  of  factors  to  explain  the  promise  of 
institutional investors: 




incentives  to cheat; money manager  fear of political  reaction  to abuse  institutional power; and  the 
need to balance the risk of  institutional abuse of power against the certainty of corporate manager 
abuses under the existing system”312. 
Institutions  can  be  key  players  to  monitor  directors  and  managers  in  widely‐held  firms 
(vertical  conflicts),  but  they  are  also  able  to  “have  an  important  role  in  policing  the  conduct  of 
controlling shareholders”313 in controlled firms (horizontal conflicts), which are proportionally more 
prevalent in Canada314. That said, MacIntosh argues that the need for institutions is generally lesser 
in  controlled  firms,  since  the  controlling  shareholder  performs  monitoring  functions315. 
Nevertheless,  if  institutions  can  stave  off  Insider  abuse  and  raise  the  quality  of  corporate 
governance, this creates a wave of benefits for more vulnerable free‐riding minority shareholders. 
However, as we will quickly understand, severe limitations weigh on institutional investors’ 
ability  or  incentives  to  act.  Institutionals,  like  individuals,  are  prone  to  exhibit  passive  behaviour. 
Bainbridge paints a rather disheartening picture of institutional shareholder activism: 
“Today,  there  is  relatively  little  evidence  that  shareholder  activism  has  mattered.  Even  the  most 
active  institutional  investors  spend  only  trifling  amounts  on  corporate  governance  activism. 
Institutions devote little effort to monitoring management; to the contrary, they typically disclaim the 
ability or desire to decide company‐specific policy questions. They rarely conduct proxy solicitations 
or  put  forward  shareholder  proposals.  They  tend  not  to  try  to  elect  representatives  to  boards  of 
directors. They rarely coordinate their activities”316. 
Pozen  posits  that  this  observed  passivity might  be  tributary  to  the  only  “modest  returns” 
expected by institutionals from governance interventions317. In fact, many if not most institutionals 
tend  to  stay  away  from  conducting  expensive  proxy  fights  and proposing  nominees  for  corporate 
elections.  It appears very few institutional  investors have ever submitted shareholder proposals to 
affect  corporate  governance.  A  1996  study  by  Daily  finds  that  only  13  of  the  975  institutions 
surveyed  had  ever  submitted  a  proposal  over  a  period  of  8  years318.  Furthermore,  institutionals 
appear to spend very little on corporate governance. A 1997 study by Del Guercio and Hawkins finds 
that “activist  institutions spend  less  than 0.005% per year on governance  issues, while  they spend 
100x  more  on  stock  picking  management  fees319.  Not  only  do  they  participate  infrequently  and 
spend little, they tend to deploy limited efforts when they do vote. According to Black, they either 
support management, follow the ISS recommendation or follow a pre‐existing voting guideline320.  
Many  other  factors  also  help  to  justify  the  passivity  displayed  by  institutionals  in  firm 
governance. Black summarizes: 





issues  from  the  frameworks  put  forth  in  two  seminal  papers  on  institutional  activism:  Black’s 
Shareholder Passivity Re‐Examined  on  the US  side and MacIntosh’s The Role of  Institutional Retail 
Investors in Canadian Capital Markets for a Canadian perspective. We will also complete our analysis 







large  blocks  of  equity  and  to  actively  exercise  control  rights  over  their  blocks. While  none  of  the 
rules by itself prohibits activism, both MacIntosh and Black agree that it is the cumulative effect of 







First, proxy  rules,  in  addition  to  these  “agenda  control”  advantages,  also make  proxies  a 
cumbersome  and  costly mechanism  for  institutionals. Overall,  the  rules make  it more  difficult  for 
institutional  investors to own large blocks and to coordinate action amongst themselves. The rules 
include  both  substantive  and  procedural  constraints.  Substantively,  in  the  US,  proxy  rule  14(a)(8) 
“bars  access  in  three  key  areas:  directors  nominations,  statements  in  opposition  to management 









qualify  solicitors  are  “sweeping”331,  which  can  have  a  “chilling  effect”332  on  shareholder 
communication. Management  can  sue  shareholders  soliciting  proxies  (or  communicating  amongst 
each other to that goal)  if they are not properly disclosing their activities. Shareholders must go to 
great  lengths  not  only  to  disclose  their  solicitation,  but  also  to  include  all  materials  facts  in  its 




a  pro‐management  bias  of  SEC  staff333. Due  to  the  complexity  and  risk  of  the procedural  aspects, 
costly legal counsel is inevitable to navigate proxy waters334.  
It must be noted that in Canada, recent corporate law and securities law reforms have gone 
to  great  lengths  to  ease  proxy  rules  to  favour  shareholder  activism.  The  CSA’s  2003  National 
Instrument  51‐102  provides  a  number  of  provisions  exempting  shareholders  from  disclosure 
obligations  in various situations and relaxes the definition of proxy solicitation, with the benefit of 
enhancing  shareholder  communication. Because of  these  reforms  in  the  last 5  years,  coalitions of 
instititutionals  investors,  such  as  the  highly  influent  CCGG  group  in  Canada,  have  been  able  to 
effectively  play  an  increasingly  larger  role  in  jawboning  poorly‐governed  firms  to  change  their 
governance  practices.  In  many  cases,  the  benefits  of  this  activism  also  profit  smaller  free‐riding 
shareholders. At this time, there does not seem to be a coalition exerting such influence in the US 
market, most  likely because of  stricter  sollicitation  restrictions. While  the  smaller  size  and  tightly‐
knit  nature  of  the  Canadian  financial  community  may  be  responsible  for  this  outcome,  the 
emergence of a private coalition of institutional investors, who have the potential to self‐govern the 
corporations  in  their  portfolio  with  minimal  resort  to  the  courts,  seems  an  exciting  avenue  of 
“promise” for insititutional shareholder activism and better corporate governance in the future. 
Second,  insider‐trading  rules  can  add  reporting  burden  and  litigation  risk,  while  reducing 
liquidity  for  the  large  institutional  shareholder.  In  the  US,  under  article  16  of  the  SEC  rules,  10% 
beneficial  owners  are  treated  like  corporate directors  and officers,  in  that  they need  to  report  all 
stocks purchases and sales on a monthly basis and are prohibited from swing trading profits335. Most 





which will  reduce  its  liquidity, or abstain  from trading337. This  recognition  is of critical  importance, 
since it will discourage institutionals both from owning a block larger than 10% (which would help to 
mitigate  collective  action  problems)  or  from  electing  representatives  to  the  Board  (which  may 
ensure better monitoring and reduce information costs). If they do carry forward with deputization, 
they  can  try  to  shield  themselves  from  litigation  by  isolating  the  nominated  director  from  the 
institution with  a  Chinese wall338.  Institutions  also want  to  avoid  the  large  damages  and  negative 
publicity associated with insider trading violations. 
Third,  takeover  rules  also discourage  institutionals  from owning  large blocks of  shares. As 
detailed earlier, poison pills are widely‐used and effective methods of defending against a  control 
attempt  from  an  external  shareholder  building  a  large  block.  The  poison  pill  can  be  triggered  if 
another shareholder “acquires beneficial ownership of more than threshold percentage”339, usually 




which  can  provoke  dilution,  a  drop  in  share  price  and massive  losses  for  the  institution.  As  Black 
comments:  “Institutional  financiers  can’t  take  even  a  small  risk  of  triggering  a  poison  pill.  The 
downside risk  is simply too great. Thus the pill  is a near absolute barrier  to  forming a shareholder 
group larger than the threshold percentage”341. 






Fifth,  ownership  disclosure  requirements  impose  cost  and  legal  risk  for  institutional 
investors345. In the US, the SEC’s Rule(13)(d) requires ownership disclosure from any person or group 
owning more than 5%346. In schedule (13)(d), the group must reveal its identity but also its purpose 
(acquisition, proxy  fight, hostile  takeover, undervalued  investment, etc…). Company managers can 
sue the group for various reasons, typically misdisclosure of its purpose347, forcing the group to bear 
the cost of the suit. This  leaves  institutionals with a catch‐22 that Black describes as “If  they don’t 
organize, they’re unlikely to succeed. […] If shareholders do organize, they’ve formed a group with 
attending reporting requirements and litigation risk”348.  In Canada, buying a 10% stake triggers the 
“early  warning  system”,  which  requires  immediate  filing  of  a  press  release  and  new  reporting 
obligations349 to notify minority shareholders of a potential change of control event. 
Sixth,  controlling  person  liability  imposes  a  number  of  additional  obligations  on  large 
institutional  shareholders.  According  to  SEC  rule  144,  the  “control  person”  can  only  sell  shares 
through a “registered offering of the ‘dribble‐out’ provisions […], which involves delay, expense and 
[...]  liability”350.  The  dribble‐out  provisions  also  hamper  the  shareholder’s  liquidity.  The  control 
person,  a  term  that  is  again widely  interpreted,  becomes  “liable  for  the  company’s  securities  law 
violations”351.  In  Canada,  MacIntosh  states  that  stock  sales  from  control  persons  (set  at  20% 
threshold of ownership) are subject to additional reporting obligations and a hold period between 6 
and 18 months on the sale, which significantly reduces the liquidity of the controlling person352. 
Seventh,  the  fiduciary  liability  of  pension  fund managers  steer  them  away  from  activism 
into  the prudent  pastures  of  passive  ownership.  In  the US,  corporate  pension plan  fiduciaries  are 
liable  under  ERISA,  while  public  pension  fund  managers  are  liable  under  the  “common  law  of 





large blocks.  The nature of  the  institution might  impose  stock‐holding  limitations.  In  the US, bank 
holding  companies  can  own  stock  only  through  their  ‘trust’  arms  and never  above  5% of  a  single 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Ninth,  ownership  aggregation  issues  complicate  accounting  of  stakes,  which  has  the 
potential to inadvertently trigger obligations associated with any or many of the rules listed above. 
For  example,  pension  and  mutual  funds,  who  typically  have  assets  with  many  money  managers 





conflicts  can be  at  the manager  level  or  the  institutional  level.  At  the manager  level,  institutional 
managers  have  “limited  incentives  to monitor  because  they  keep  only  a  fraction  of  the  portfolio 




that  public  pension  funds  and  mutual  funds  are  the  two  groups  who  have  “fewer  conflicts  of 
interest” and are best positioned to lead institutional governance efforts363, but also adds that “no 
institution is conflict free”364. Corporate pension fund managers, banks and insurers face particularly 
strong  pro‐manager  pressure,  since  they  must  please  corporate  clients  to  attract  or  retain 
business365. 
Second,  in  terms  of  competence,  the  expertise  of  fund  managers  as  investors  may  not 
translate into an executive decision‐making expertise366. Black’s argument that “economies of scale” 
exist  when  managers  learn  to  intervene  on  recurring  issues  (such  as  director  nominations  and 
antitakeover  measures)  across  many  corporations367  needs  to  be  counterbalanced  by  the  low 





For  many  authors  like  Black,  this  situation  is  unfortunate  and  reduces  the  quality  of 
corporate  governance.  Black  suggests  there  is  a  “strong  case  for  reform”,  especially  through 
deregulation  of  the  legal  barriers  impeding  activism369.  He  argues  that  a  new  facilitating  regime 
should  “facilitate  joint  shareholder  action  not  directed  at  control”370  and  calls  for  a  larger 
“institutional  voice”  that  would  lie  somewhere  in  the  center  on  the  continuum  spanning  from 





Another  contextual  force  strengthening  the  hold  of  Insiders  on  corporate  power  is  the 
“permissive”  legislative  approach,  which  promotes  self‐regulation  rather  than  strict  mandatory 
rules. It “abstains from imposing one set of governance norms on corporations” and lets firms select 
on  their  own  what  they  believe  are  “value‐maximizing  governance  norms”373.  In  other  words, 
corporate governance is viewed as a “private matter left to the discretion of corporate actors”374.  
As  Rousseau  notes,  the  permissive  or  enabling  approach  is  well  rooted  in  corporate  law 
theory.  If  the corporation  is a nexus of contracts, corporate  law should be principally  to “facilitate 
the  formation  of  contracts”375.  The  corporation  itself  was  created  as  a  “simple  and  flexible” 
procedure  to  dispense businessmen  from  “unnecessary  formalism”376.  The permissive  approach  is 
also consistent with the business judgment rule that pervades corporate law377.  
While  the  permissive  approach  is  widely  recognized  in  corporate  law  literature  as  more 
appropriate than prohibitive law in order to give corporations sufficient flexibility to meet business 
needs, the absence of more binding law may fail to deter opportunistic acts by Insiders.  
Private  norms  are  also  often  referred  to  as  “non‐legally  enforceable  rules  and  standards 
(NLERS)”378,  which  are  typically  self‐enforcing  but  can  also  be  enforced  by  guilt,  shunning  or 
shaming379. Corporation themselves can make their own informal rules or can choose to follow more 
official norms proposed by stock exchanges. Most stock exchange norms relate to the structure and 




the  Canadian  financial  marketplace,  including  higher  ownership  concentration  and  smaller 
capitalization  of  its  companies380.  The  Canadian  landscape  makes  it  even  more  important  for 




the  reform  efforts  of  the  last  two  decades.  In  three  separate  instances,  corporate  governance 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result might  then  be  tokenism  or  cosmetic  “window  dressing”.  […] We  hope  that major  Canadian 
companies will  respond to these suggestions  in a positive way, and will  incorporate them into their 
formal operating activities”381. 
The  1993 Dey  taskforce  elaborated  in  its Where Were  the  Directors?  report  a  number  of 
guiding  principles  for  publicly‐listed  corporations,  but  the  Toronto  Stock  Exchange  in  the  end 
preferred not to make the principles imperative. As Rousseau notes: 
“The Manual  encourages  issuers  to  take  into  consideration  the  guidelines  enacted  but  leaves  it  to 
issuers to determine the extent of their compliance”382. 
The 2001 Saucier taskforce also preferred not to make their recommendations mandatory: 
“While  there may be a place  for  regulating some aspects of corporate governance, our view  is  that 
disclosure is a much better approach than attempting to regulate behavior, if one is seeking to build a 
healthy  governance  culture.  Indeed,  we  believe  that  regulation  aimed  at  changing  board  behavior 
may turn out to be counterproductive”383. 
The 2003 securities laws reforms also generally shied away from more invasive legislation: 
Market participants and  regulators debated over adopting a US‐style,  rules‐based  system.   In many 
cases, Canadian regulators have been reluctant to impose regulations, choosing instead to encourage 
good corporate governance through voluntary best standards and guidelines384.  
In  many  cases,  the  reform  committees  preferred  “disclosure‐based”  approaches,  where 
corporations  simply  disclose  their  governance  practices  and  to  what  extent  they  adhere  to 
recommendations,  rather  than  more  binding  approaches.  However,  letting  corporation  “regulate 
themselves”385  often  affords  corporations  with  too  much  creativity  relative  to  their  compliance 
statement.  As was  noted  famously  in  the Cadbury  report,  the  “How much  is  enough  to  establish 
compliance?” question for directors quickly becomes “How much can I get away with?”386. 
For this reason, Rousseau points out that the effectiveness of private norms should “not be 
overstated”387. Also,  if  shareholders do not have access  to adequate  information  (only 51% of TSX 
firms  produced  compliance  statements  in  Canada,  and  even  those  statements  were  often  of  a 
general nature388) or if that information is not credible (it is impossible or too costly to ascertain the 
veracity  of  the  statements),  shareholders  will  not  be  able  to  actively  discriminate  between  firms 
with  good  and  bad  governance  practices.  Therefore,  they  cannot  easily  discipline  firms  with  bad 
governance by selling their shares in the open market389. That said, it should be noted that security 
law  reforms  in  2003  considerably  strengthened  the quality  of  the disclosure,  notably  through 
the adoption of multi‐lateral  instruments MI 52‐109  (Certification of Disclosure  in  Issuers’ Annual 
and Interim Filings), MI 52‐110 (Audit Committees), MI 52‐111 (Internal Controls), as well as national 





While  the  improved  transparency  accompanying  these  new  disclosure  requirements 
may  in  some  cases  deter  some  officers  from  opportunistic  behaviour,  the  permissive 








The  passivity  of  individual  retail  shareholders,  which  manifests  itself  by  a  preference  for 
non‐interventionism and a  sort  of  “rational  apathy”  related  to  governance  affairs,  is  another  very 
powerful force conferring discretion to Insiders.  
The  passivity  and  apathy  of  the  individual  shareholder  can  be  explained  by  a  few  main 




One  shareholder must bare all  the  costs and  reap only a part of  the  rewards produced by action. 
Also,  since  small  individual  shareholders  typically  do  not  own  a  significant  share  block,  they  are 
unable  to  meaningfully  exercise  control  over  the  corporation.  This  is  the  “drop  in  the  bucket” 
argument  made  by  Black391.  There  are  additionally  a  number  of  regulatory  obstacles  hindering 
communication  and  co‐operation  in  the  shareholder  base, which  could  help  to mitigate  collective 
action  problems.  Co‐operation,  while  naturally  difficult  with  a  fragmented  shareholding  base,  is 
made even more difficult with legal requirements relative to the size of the co‐operation group. In 
the US, Kraakman points  to  the “registration requirement  for any  ‘5%’ group of shareholders who 
agree to coordinate their voices” as a “significant barrier” to co‐operation392.  
A  form of “rational apathy” ensues, where shareholders have  little  incentive or  interest  in 
matters of firm governance, unless the problem is so large that the benefit of intervention makes it 
worthwhile to intervene. Given this baseline context of apathy, the shareholder will typically prefer 
to exit  and  sell his  shares,  rather  than  trying  to proactively  improve governance. This  shareholder 
choice  of  selling  their  stock  or  getting  involved  in  corporate  governance  is  known  in  corporate 
literature as the choice between ‘exit’ and ‘voice’393: 
When unsatisfied with  the management of  the portfolio  corporations,  it  appears more  rational  for 






Shareholder  apathy  is  common  in  widely‐held  firms  and  indeed  “magnifies  the  agency 
problem”  by  giving  Insiders  more  discretion,  heightening  the  risk  of  opportunistic  behaviour. 
However, as Rousseau, Daniels and MacIntosh also note, this apathy is equally present in controlled 
firms: 
“Apathy  by  minority  shareholders  enables  the  dominant  shareholder  to  use  the  control  of  the 
corporation to realize self‐serving operations detrimental to the corporation as a whole”395. 
Second, action  is  costly  relative  to  free‐riding.  The  costs  that  shareholders must bare are 
tributary  of  the  general  regulatory  hurdles  they  must  face  to  enact  change  in  the  corporation. 
Shareholders  have  little  motive  to  exercise  rights  or  instigate  often  expensive  governance 
mechanisms. Shareholders adopt a wait‐and‐see approach while “free‐riding” the beneficial changes 
enacted by larger shareholders396 rather than instigating themselves. According to Kraakman: 






he would  find  that his power  to  initiate action would be extremely  limited. We will  explore  later 
more in depth the weakness of shareholder “initiation rights”. As a quick example, we can note that 
most shareholders proposals must receive board approval before being presented to shareholders. 
For  all  these  reasons,  passivity  is  the  default  stance  of  individual  shareholders,  conferring 
large discretion to Insiders. On the other hand, this must be tempered by a few factors. Proxy rules, 
like those of the SEC in the US, do force Insiders to “make sweeping and embarrassing disclosures, to 
guarantee  the  insurgent  solicitation materials  will  reach  the  company  shareholders,  and  in  some 
cases to allow shareholders to piggyback proposals opposed by management at negligible cost”398. 
Kraakman  also  points  to  the  US  as  possibly  the  “only  jurisdiction  to  permit  corporations  to 
compensate  successful  insurgents ex post  for  their  campaign costs”399. While  this provision allows 
the  instigating  shareholder  to  recuperate  some  costs,  our  understanding  is  that  it  neither  allows 
reimbursement  of  unsuccessful  insurgents  nor  allows  for  a  practical  mechanism  for  cost‐sharing 
across  the  shareholding  base  to  reduce  free‐riding.  As  Rousseau  notes,  the  force  of  shareholder 
apathy must also be tempered by the modest activism of large institutional shareholders400.  
In  Canada,  the  collective  action  conundrum  is  tempered  by  a  more  concentrated 
shareholder base. The presence of dominant shareholders with substantial voting power mitigates 
the collective action problem, since shareholders have a subtantial economic interest that warrants 
getting  involved  in decision‐making  if necessary401. However, as Crête and Rousseau astutely point 












For  example,  fraud  at  Enron  relied  heavily  on  dormant  accounting  work  from  Arthur 
Andersen.  In  this case, Andersen sought  to preserve  lucrative consulting business by glossing over 
suspicious  off‐balance  sheet  transactions.   More  recently,  the  demise  of  financial  institutions  like 
Bear  Stearns  and  Lehman  Brothers  was  intimately  linked  to  external  credit  rating  agencies  like 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. In that case, credit rating agencies gave healthy ratings to special‐
purpose  vehicles  (SPV),  for  example  mortgage‐backed  securities,  while  at  the  same  time  being 
compensated  by  these  same  financial  institutions  for  their  rating  reports.  Although  these  high 
ratings  facilitated  the  securitization of  low‐value  assets  and  their  commercialization  to  the public, 
they proved artificially optimistic about the cash‐flows linked to the assets underlying the SPV. Even 
though,  in a post‐Enron world,  tough new  laws  like  SOX and new professional  standards  limit  the 




First,  accountants  review  and  verify  financial  statements  of  corporations.  Their  mission 
depends on their independence, professional judgment and objectivity404. Rousseau summarizes the 
main  perils  likely  to  corrupt  these  core  values:  personal  interest  (if  an  accountant  has  a  direct 
interest  in  a  corporation),  self‐review  (if  an  accountant  is  reviewing  his  own  work),  familiarity, 
representation  and  intimidation405.  As  illustrated  by  Enron,  accounting  firms  offering  multiple 
services  may  have  a  higher  threat  to  independence,  if  performance  in  one  business  stream 
influences the winning of lucrative business in another stream. 
Second, financial analysts are the “watchdogs” that monitor the evolution of a corporation’s 
performance  and  financial  situations406.  While  analysts  are  theoretically  encouraged  to  be 
independent and objective by their professional code of ethics and Securities law standards, various 
business circumstances may alter this default mode. Financial analysts can trade in the securities of 
the  corporation  as  personal  investors,  typically  on  the  open  markets  and  possibly  through 
derivatives,  giving  them  a  particular  interest which may  taint  their  independence.  In  some  cases, 
they can also have business relationships with outside corporations. Such conflicts typically need to 
be  formally  disclosed  to  the  institution  by  the  analyst. When  a  corporation  does  business with  a 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financial  institution,  an  analyst  may  be  pressured  to  treat  the  corporation  favourably  for  the 
institution to keep that business, especially when part of his compensation comes directly from the 
outside  corporation.  Like  accountants,  this  conflict  of  interest  problem  compounds  when  an 
institution  offers  multiple  services  (research  and  rating,  financing,  M&A,  consulting,  etc…),  and 









In  the  US,  SOX  reform  has  imposed  tough  new  regulations  to  structure  the  corporation’s 
interactions with various external gatekeepers. Later in section 3.3.1., we will explore more in detail 
a  few  of  these  regulations,  notably  the  changes  in  the  audit  process  for  accountants.  In  Canada, 
similar  reforms  have  been modeled  on  SOX,  notably  the  CSA’s  52‐108,  52‐109  and  52‐110  rules, 
which  aim  to  increase  the  confidence  of  shareholders  in  the  financial  statements  produced  by  
corporations  and  verified  by  their  auditors407.  It  is  particularly  interesting  to  note  that  securities 








  Happily,  small  shareholders  benefit  from  many  protections  against  Insider  opportunism, 
especially  in  Canada  and  the  US.  In  this  section,  we  analyze  this  “multi‐strand  web  of  imperfect 
constraints on managers”409. 
  These  protections  are  scattered  through  multiple  sources  of  law,  encompassing  but  not 
restricted  to  the  corporation’s  constitution  act,  the  civil  or  commercial  code,  case  law  and 
jurisprudence,  stock  market  act  and  securities  regulations,  stock  exchange  listing  rules,  civil 
procedure, the criminal code, banking law and bankruptcy law. This complexity can be compounded 
by  the  fact  that  both  in  Canada  and  in  the  US,  substantive  law  exists  both  at  the  federal  and 
province/state level respectively.  
We  attempt  to  distillate  what  seems  to  be  a  daunting  array  of  sources  of  law  into  an 
overview  of  the  core  protections  available  to  a  small  wronged  shareholder.  We  separate  again 
between  three  categories  of  protections:  (1)  Internal  Governance,  (2)  Regulatory  and  (3) Market 
mechanisms. 













the  board’s  central  decision‐making  authority.  Perhaps  above  and  beyond  any  other  mechanism 












The  link  between ownership  structure  and  the  effectiveness  of  the  trusteeship  strategy  is 
interesting  to explore. Trusteeship  is particularly useful  for US widely‐held  firms,  since  small‐block 
minority  shareholders  cannot  directly  elect  their  own  candidates.  In  theory,  large  public 
corporations  have  regulatory  incentives  to  try  to  find  motivated,  competent  directors  to  act  as 
objectively as possible416. On the flipside,  in controlled firms, dominant shareholders can  influence 
elections  and  elect  representatives  that  do  not  necessarily  favour minority  shareholder  interests. 
Therefore, as a minority shareholder, trusteeship will make more sense in a widely‐held context417. 
This can be somewhat counter‐intuitive. It should be logical that the more shareholders are able to 
design  the  board,  the  more  they  should  be  able  to  trust  their  decisions.  However,  if  some 
shareholders  have  too  much  facility  designing  the  board  to  match  their  own  interests,  minority 





of  directors  in many  corporate  decision‐making  situations,  there  are  several  observers who  think 
that directors can generally indeed be “trusted to do what is best for shareholders”419. Bainbridge is 
among  the  strongest  advocates  of  a model  based  on  a  central  decision‐making  body  that makes 
unreviewable,  informed and binding decisions, which he calls “director primacy”. Director primacy 
installs directors as a “Platonic guardian” at the center of the corporation to act as the “coordinator” 
of  the nexus of  contracts420. Bainbridge sees  the Board as a highly‐efficient body  that  reduces  the 
transaction  costs  associated  with  a  more  distributed  shareholder  decision‐making  or  approval 
system. This is similar to how the corporation reduces transaction costs relative to free contracting 
in  the  marketplace,  as  advanced  by  Nobel‐winners  Oliver  Williamson  and  Ronald  Coase421. 
Bainbridge goes so far as to suggest that the “preservation of managerial discretion should always 
be  the  null  hypothesis”422.  In  his model,  team dynamics,  reputation  and  the market  act  as  strong 
forces  limiting opportunism. Based on director primacy, board approval should be the default step 
and the most essential force protecting shareholders. 
 In  related‐party  transactions,  the  board  has  a  strong  incentive  to  get  a  conflicted 
transaction approved by a disinterested directors. With this disinterested approval, this decision will 
either be completely shielded from judicial review following the business judgment rule (in RMBCA 
states)  or  it  will  “shift  the  burden  of  proof  of  unfairness  from  the  defending  director  to  the 
challenger” (in Delaware and other states)423. As for related‐party transactions regarding executive 
compensation, all  compensation of  top officers must be approved by  the board, but  is once again 





US widely‐held  firms,  since small‐block minority  shareholders are unlikely  to hold‐up decisions ex‐
ante425.  Board  approval  is  cheap,  fast  and  provides  few  “false  positives”  (blocking  efficient 
transactions).  However,  it  may  also  lead  to  high  “false  negatives”  (failing  to  block  inefficient 
transactions)  if  directors  do  not  have  the  interest  to  intervene426.  In  Canada,  related‐party 
transactions must be examined through an independent evaluation by a special committee of board 
members  and  is  subject  to  “majority  of  the  minority”  voting,  which  we  will  explore  in  the  next 
section, involving all shareholders affected by the potential transaction427. 
In major transactions, board approval is generally required, but must often be accompanied 
by  shareholder  approval  for  certain  important  corporate  changes.  In  the  US,  board  review  alone 
does  not  suffice  when  “corporate  actions  are  large,  investment‐like  and  potentially  self‐
interested”428.  In  such  situations,  it  is  thought  that  the  benefits  of  shareholder  approval  almost 
always  exceed  its  costs.  In  Canada,  shareholder  approval  is  required  in  a  defined  set  of  major 
transactions:  1)  mergers,  2)  liquidation,  3)  distribution  or  sale  of  assets  and  4)  going‐private 
transactions429. Approval is usually required by a 2/3 majority, although there are some substantive 
and  procedural  differences  in  corporate  law  between  the  approval  of  major  transactions  at  the 
federal  level  in  Canada  and  in  Quebec.  For  example,  in  the  event  of  a  liquidation430,  Quebec 
companies  must  gather  the  votes  of  2/3  of  present  and  voting  shareholders,  while  Canadian 
corporations need 2/3 of present shareholders only, voting or not431. Another striking difference lies 
in the sale of assets. In Canada, the board must obtain a 2/3 majority of all shareholders (voting or 
not,  for  each  category  of  shares)  in  order  to  sell  all  or  a  substantial  portion  of  the  corporation’s 
assets  when  the  sale  is  not  performed  in  the  regular  course  of  business432,  while  in  Quebec  the 
board  is  in  theory  free  to  dispose  of  the  company’s  assets  without  any  shareholder  approval433. 
Several  other  major  transactions  also  may  not  require  shareholder  approval,  such  as  making  an 
investment  in another corporation, as well as short‐form vertical amalgamations (a holding and its 
subsidiary)  or  horizontal  short‐form  amalgamations  (two  wholly‐owned  subsidiaries  of  a  same 
holding) in Canada434. Therefore, shareholder power of approval is relatively well‐defined in cases of 
major transactions. Generally, the board is the first line of defense in analyzing and approving major 
transactions.  Board  members  have  duties  to  perform  these  tasks  in  the  best  interests  of  the 
corporation and its shareholders. This is why board approval is, even in major transactions, a source 







However,  as  we  have  seen  earlier,  ownership  structures  impose  important  practical 




representative  interest.  In  a  controlled  firm,  a  minority  shareholder  is  not  likely  to  be  able  to 
naturally vote down a dominant shareholder, who is mostly free to vote for corporate proposals that 
serve his own interests best, rather than those of all shareholders. 
That  said,  there  are many ways  shareholders  can  participate  in  corporate  voting. We will 





First,  the power  to  affect  the composition of  the board  plays  an essential  role  in  shaping 
power dynamics in the corporation. Shareholder can help to define a few important characteristics 
of the board. According to Kraakman, these characteristics are: “the size of the board (small boards 
are  better),  the  committee  structure  of  the  board  (independent  audit,  compensation  and 
nominating committees are good), the frequency of board meetings (more meetings are better), and 
the  ratio  of  insiders  to  independent  directors  (a  majority  of  independent  directors  is  good)”435. 
Shareholders  are  also  increasingly  bringing  forward  propositions  to  repeal  staggered  or  classified 
boards. 
There  are  several  guidelines  or  best  practices  that  shareholders  can  look  to  in  order  to 
improve the quality of the board, notably those published by stock exchanges. While most of these 
recommendations  are  not  binding  on  management,  shareholders  can  try  to  pressure  Insiders  to 
adopt them, either by disclosing their compliance to the guidelines or by bringing forth proposals on 
issues  in  a  piecemeal way.  Given  the  central  importance  of  the  board,  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the 
shareholders that it be the most efficient, transparent and independent possible.  
Second,  shareholders  have  selection  and  removal  rights  for  corporate  directors. 
Shareholders  have  selection  and  removal  rights  for  directors, which  are  in  theory  proportional  to 
their  economic  rights436.  These  rights  can  be  exercised  at  the  shareholder  meeting,  by  mail  or 
through proxies. Again, this is the “safety valve” of the corporate governance system437.  
Terms are also a critical aspect of the ability to remove directors. In the US, directors have a 
term  of  1  year,  which  as  we  have  seen  can  be  extended  to  3  years  in  the  event  of  a  staggered 
board438. Mid‐term replacement of directors is notoriously difficult and costly due to the need to call 
a  special  shareholder  meeting439.  However,  absent  staggered  boards,  the  comparatively  short 
duration  of  director  tenure  should  make  it  easy  to  replace  underperforming  directors  with  new 
blood  at  the  end  of  their  terms.  The  issue  lays  either  when  directors  run  opposed  (due  to  the 
inability of  shareholders  to nominate  candidates  to  the  slate) or when  staggered boards preclude 




Shareholders  have  a  few  mechanisms  to  exercise  more  forcefully  their  selection  and 
removal  rights:  (1)  Proxy  contests441  and  (2)  Withhold‐the‐vote  campaigns.  On  the  one‐hand,  in 
proxy contests, a dissident group of shareholders can propose an alternative slate of directors. Other 
shareholders may vote  their  shares  for  the dissident slate  to displace entrenched directors. As we 
have  seen, proxy  fights  are expensive  for  shareholders who must bare  their  fees while being at  a 
relative  disadvantage  to  management’s  control  of  the  agenda.  On  the  other‐hand,  withhold‐the‐
vote  campaigns  (also known as  just‐say‐no voting) allow shareholders  to vote  their  shares against 
the slate of directors proposed by  the  incumbent board. Shareholders can  therefore express  their 
dissatisfaction by abstaining during voting in order to send a message to management.  
Third, modifications to electoral voting ground rules can augment the impact of shareholder 
voting.  While  some  of  the  voting  powers  come  from  default  provisions  (ex:  the  1:1  rule),  other 
provisions can be initiated by shareholders (ex: cumulative voting) through a variety of methods. In 
an  interesting  turn, shareholders actually have significant power  to  increase  the efficiency of  their 
own voting, by putting together and voting on proposals that change the “electoral ground rules” of 
voting. In other words, shareholders can “boost” their own voting power442.  
There  are  several  key  electoral  ground  rules  that  can  often  be  set  by  shareholders:  (1) 
cumulative voting443, (2) majority voting (3) voting caps and (4) other procedural aspects. 
First,  cumulative  voting  can  help  to  protect  minority  shareholders  by  ensuring 
representation  on  the  board  of  directors.  In  a  cumulative  voting  process,  each  board member  is 
elected  individually  and  shareholders  can  vote  all  their  shares  to  support  one  specific  board 
member, which gives smaller shareholders a much better chance to contribute to elect at least one 
board  member  to  represent  their  interests444.  While  cumulative  voting  is  mandatory  in  other 
jurisdictions, shareholders in the US must explicitly vote to enact it in order to change the default 1:1 
electoral  ground  rule.  The  elected  minority  directors  will  benefit  from  access  to  corporate 
information  in board meetings and can also participate  in board committees  to gain more specific 
powers.  That  said,  not  all  shareholders  automatically  prefer  cumulative  voting.  Shareholders may 
fear  that  cumulative  voting  will  challenge  the  regular  authority  of  the  board,  especially  through 
“hold‐ups”  by  other  minority  shareholders,  board  deadlocks,  and  slower  decision‐making445. 
Cumulative  voting  usually  applies  to  electoral  decisions  only,  not  to  other  substantive  corporate 
decisions. 
Second, majority voting  strengthens  the ability  for shareholders  to send a message to  the 
Board by in effect voting against directors. The CCGG, which is a strong proponent of this technique 
in  Canada  (especially  in  conjunction  with  voting  for  directors  individually),  explains  the  current 
landscape: “Currently, the voting of directors is based on a ‘plurality system’ whereby shareholders 















Fourth,  procedural  aspects  of  voting  can  include:  the  confidentiality  of  voting449,  proxy 
access  by mail450,  the  non‐blocking  of  shares  before  the  shareholder meeting451  and  independent 
vote tabulation. 
In  Canada,  as  far  as  voting  rights  in  general,  the  CBCA  confers  many  voting  rights  to 
shareholders452,  the most  fundamental  of which  is  likely  the  right  to elect453  or  remove  corporate 
directors.  In  terms of voting procedure,  the CBCA establishes  the  ‘one‐share one‐vote’  rule as  the 
shareholder default454 but permits  adoption of  a  cumulative  voting procedure455, which allows  for 
accrued  representation  of  minority  shareholders,  although  this  is  not  mandatory.  It  allows 










As we have  seen,  corporations  follow a  representative  system where  the  voice of  shareholders  is 
proportional  to  their  interest.  Under  this  form  of  ‘government’,  directors  manage  the  basic 
governance  arrangements  of  the  corporation,  while  shareholders  have  “little  direct  say  in  the 
running of  the  corporation”459.  Judges  confer  to  Insiders  a high  level  of decision making authority 
“not unlike that possessed by the members of a Legislature”460. 
Rather,  corporate  law  encourages  shareholder  involvement  only  in  situations where  “full‐
delegation to management is clearly inappropriate”461, like when directors face conflicts of interest 
(related‐party  transactions)  or  when  directors  make  decisions  that  fundamentally  alter  the 
corporation (major transactions). While managers are theoretically “disinterested” in their decision‐
making,  there  is  no  doubt  that  shareholders  are  “affirmatively  interested  in  preserving  corporate 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value”462.  As  we  have  mentioned,  shareholder  approval  thus  makes  a  good  safeguard  for  board 
approval  in  decisions  laced  with  the  potential  for  managerial  opportunism.  For  those  important 
decisions,  the  benefits  of  “short‐circuiting”  the  usual  corporate  governance  model  of  board 
authority are thought to outweigh the costs463.  
In terms of ownership structure, shareholder approval is important in both widely‐held and 
controlled  firms.  In  both  cases,  the  danger  is  that  the  Insider  (either managers  or  the  controlling 
shareholder) will “misuse power to extract gains unavailable to all shareholders”464. However, there 
is a “suspicion” that conflicts may be even more acute in controlled firms, since even “disinterested” 
directors  in controlled  firms may have close  ties with  the controlling shareholders465. According  to 





the common requirement  for  supermajority voting.  In  the context of  supermajority voting,  “large‐
block minority shareholders will sometimes have the power to block corporate actions”468. While a 
2/3 supermajority is the requirement in most jurisdictions worldwide, the US in theory requires only 
a  simple majority of outstanding shares, even  for  important  transactions  like mergers, asset  sales, 
dissolutions  and  charter  amendments469.  This  may  be  tributary  to  the  widely‐held  ownership 
structure  of  US  corporations  or  to  the  power  of  directors  to  review  transactions.  That  said, 
Kraakman notes an  important technical detail  in the US system, which “implicitly”470 brings the US 
closer  to  the  supermajority  voting  rule.  If  only  70%  of  outstanding  shares  vote,  “71%  of  voting 
shareholders must approve the transaction”471.  In cases of  low turnout,  the 71% percentage (even 
above  the  2/3  supermajority  rule)  is  therefore  required  to make  sure  that minority  shareholders 
have  their  voices  heard.  In  Canada  and  Quebec,  corporate  law  mandates  a  2/3  supermajority 
shareholder vote of all shares, including non‐voting shares, to approve a merger472.  
Second, majority of  the minority  voting  is  another way  shareholders  can have  their  voice 
heard in particular transactions, especially control transactions. While less widely used, courts have 
looked  to  this  type  of  vote  as  providing  “the  most  reliable  method  of  screening  conflicted 
transactions  with  controlling  shareholders”473.  Since  this  type  of  vote  in  essence  removes  the 
influence of the controlling shareholder, it can provide a veto right that allows minority shareholders 
to voice their dissatisfaction with a transaction.  It  is  interesting to understand why majority of the 
minority is particularly present and useful in the US. Since most corporations are widely‐held, most 
shareholders  are  minority  shareholders.  Majority  of  the  minority  makes  sense  in  the  context  of 
widely‐held  firms,  since  it  will  poll  the  interests  of  a  significant  fraction  of  the  ownership  base. 
Majority of the minority also makes sense  in controlled firms with a dominant shareholder, where 









right  to  the dividend of a given class, modify  the number of shares  in a given class, divide a given 
class  of  shares,  transfer  the  ownership  of  shares  in  a  given  class,  modify  the  overall  number  of 
shares or modify its stated capital. In Canada, article 173 of the CBCA474 defines the specific changes 
to  the  capital  structure  that may  trigger  a  shareholder  class  to  be unfairly  impacted.  If  the board 
wishes to modify the corporation’s statutes, it must call a special shareholder meeting according to 
article 176 of the CBCA475 where each shareholder class will vote as a separate category and where 
each  class must  approve  the  change  at  a  2/3  supermajority476.  Non‐voting  shares  become  voting 
shares for this exercise. Unless the Insiders proposing the measure own more than a 2/3 stake, class 
voting  can  effectively  protect  the  rights  of  minority  shareholders477.  Class  voting  is  thus  a  way 
shareholders  can  veto  an  undesirable  change  that  affects  their  rights.  In  the  event  of  an  Insider 
ownership stake larger than 2/3 of a given class, shareholders who have had their rights affected by 
a fundamental change may seek protection through appraisal rights478, which we will discuss shortly 
and  which  will  allow  shareholders  to  sell  back  their  shares  to  the  corporation  to  exit  their 
investment. In Quebec, we should note that there are differences in how minority shareholders are 
protected  through  class  voting.  Through  the  “conversion”  procedure479,  in  corporations who have 
explicitly  set  an  approval  procedure,  board  members  can  submit  a  modification  of  share  rights 
directly  to  shareholders  for  approval  via  article  48(7)  of  Quebec’s  Companies  Act480.  If  such  an 
approval  procedure  has  not  been  defined,  then  the  “compromise”  procedure481  dictates  that 
changes to share rights must be approved by 3/4 of shareholders of the impacted class(es), and then 
subsequently  ratified  by  the  courts  (unless  the  shareholder  vote  was  unanimous  to  approve  the 
changes) according to article 49 of Quebec’s Companies Act482. 
Secondly, in addition to modest veto rights, shareholders have mild initiation rights.  
As Kraakman  comments,  the US  is  one of  the  jurisdictions  that  “does  the most  to  restrict 
direct decision rights”483. Shareholders  lack the power to  initiate significant decisions  like mergers, 
sales  of  assets  or  dissolutions.  By  way  of  comparison,  France,  Germany  and  the  UK  all  allow 
shareholders to  initiate and approve important transactions, as  long as this  is accomplished with a 
supermajority vote484. 
That  said,  there  are  proactive  ways  by  which  shareholders  can  initiate  action  over 
substantive issues in Canada and the US, although their breadth and effectiveness may vary. In both 
US  and  Canada,  shareholders  can  exercise  their  decision  rights  mainly  through  3  types  of 
interventions:  (1)  Amendment  to  corporate  articles  or  by‐laws,  (2)  Shareholder  proposal  or  (3) 
Unanimous shareholder agreement.  
First,  shareholders  can  seek  to  make  an  amendment  to  the  articles  or  by‐laws  of  the 
corporation.  Shareholders  can  look  to make an amendment  to  regulate or  restrict  the exercise of 
the  power  of  directors485.  The  amendment  requires  a  supermajority  shareholder  vote  and  have 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binding  power  over  management486.  Although  no  board  approval  is  required,  the  amendment 
typically needs to be initially presented by the board. Furthermore, according to McGuiness, there is 
a  long  common  law  tradition  of  blocking  shareholder  interventions  that  meddle  with  firm 





supported  the  amendment,  shareholders may not  vote on  it  unless  the board  first  elects  to  have 
such  a  vote”489.  Furthermore,  while  shareholders  have  “concurrent  authority”  with  the  board  to 






a  simple majority493.  The  shareholders’  veto  right  relative  to  charter  amendments  is  protected by 
law at the federal  level, while  it must be explicitely  included  in the company articles  in Quebec494. 
Also, shareholders  in Canada have  initiation rights to present a proposal to modify a by‐law, while 
shareholders  in Quebec  do not495.  Shareholders  in Quebec  only  have  a  passive  power  to  approve 
proposals put forth by management. In any case, proposals to adopt, amend or revoke by‐laws must 
initially be approved by the board at all times496.   
Second,  shareholders  proposals  in  the  US  are  usually  presented  under  the  SEC  14(a)(8) 
article and are of a precatory nature, meaning they are not binding on management. Management 
regularly  ignores  or  disregards  the  results  of  a  shareholder  proposal,  even  if  it  succeeds.  The 
freedom  of  directors  to  ignore  proposal  results  is  protected  by  the  business  judgment  rule. 





must  be  redacted  6 months  before  circulation  of management  proxy,  reducing  its  timeliness  and 
effectiveness. It also presents important limitations, the most severe being the inability to present a 
nominee  for director  in  the  corporate elections. Black  comments on  the  limitation:  “Rule 14(a)(8) 
excludes the most important issue on which shareholders might want a voice, precisely because of 
its importance”498. In Canada, shareholders can make a shareholder proposal that will be included in 
the management  proxy  circular  and  voted  on  at  the  shareholder’s meeting  via  article  137  of  the 
CBCA. Shareholder proposals can aim to have adopted, modified or revoked an administrative rule in 




binding  power  over  management,  but  the  binding  nature  may  in  practice  vary  depending  on 
whether the proposed measure infringes on a key competence of the Board. In Quebec, corporate 
law does not allow shareholders to make such proposals500. 
Third,  shareholders  can make  a  unanimous  shareholder  agreement,  which  is  a  powerful 
written agreement  that  can  restrict, or even  sterilize501,  the exercise of power by directors.  It  can 
even remove power that was vested to directors under corporate law. Furthermore, it has a status 








Now,  let  us  examine  how  these  three  types  of  interventions,  as well  as  how  shareholder 
decision rights in general, actually stand up in practice. To accomplish this, we will again take as an 
example  the  crucial  self‐dealing  issue  of  executive  compensation.  With  regards  to  excess 
compensation, shareholders have very few efficient ways to intervene through internal governance 
structures. According  to Bebchuk  and  Fried,  shareholders  can  try  to  rein  in  executive pay  via  two 




most  stock  option  plans”505,  although  shareholders  had  some  power  in  the  past  to  vote  on 
shareholder action plans in order to have them eligible for a tax deduction. However, there remains 
a number of  issues that will  limit the meaningful  intervention of shareholders. Stock‐options plans 
are presented to investors in a very broad brush, offering few details beyond the quantity of options 
issued. Shareholders  cannot  seek  to  reject  the compensation plan  for a given executive, but must 
vote on the plan in its entirety506. The visibility of the voting procedure also heightens the perverse 
incentive  for managers  to  apply more  camouflage,  like  substituting  stock  options with  potentially 
more  costly  “share  appreciation  rights”  or  cash  payments  to managers507. Managers  can  typically 
count  on  institutionals  and  corporate  employee  stock‐option  plan  managers  to  vote  with 
management and force shareholders to accept the plan. According to Bebchuk, it appears that only 
1%  of  stock  option  plans  presented  to  shareholders  have  been  voted  down508,  illustrating  that 
managers can get their way with only weak or no resistance from shareholders.  
Second,  shareholders  can  put  together  shareholder  proposals  that  can  be  voted  on  the 







Finally,  as  pertains  to  other  important  transactions,  it  should  be  noted  that while  the  US 
allows a veto right  to shareholders on most  important transactions, both  initiation and veto rights 
are  lacking  in  “scaling‐down”  decisions  like  corporate  distributions  or  spin‐offs.  Directors  have 
significant freedom to act and do not require any shareholder approval of any kind510. 
2.3.1.3 Transaction Rights 





on  the occurrence of designated corporate  fundamental  changes, was primarily designed  to allow 




of  last  resort,  since  they  are  plagued  by  “cumbersome  procedures,  delay  and  uncertainty”513.  As 
MacIntosh states, appraisal rights “discourage all but the bravest and largest institutionals”514. As far 







rights  for  other  types  of  oppressive  decisions,  like  “asset  sales  or  charter  amendments  that  limit 








number  of  possible  fundemental  changes  undertaken  by  the  corporation.  Such  fundamental 




(other than short‐form amalgamations),  (4) change of  jurisdiction,  (5) sale or  lease of substantially 
all of  its property, or  (6) go‐private or squeeze‐out  transactions. At  the  federal  level,  shareholders 
also receive by law a dissidence right in the context of class voting519. 
There  are  also  reasons  why  appraisal  rights  may  not  be  in  the  best  interest  of  the 
corporation or all of its shareholders: (1) The payout raises the cost of a transaction, (2) The higher 
cost may cause management to abandon the proposed change or can even  jeopardize an efficient 





deals  at  lower  stock  prices  that  may  be  the  result  of  opportunistic  dealing  by  managers  or 
controlling shareholders. Pre‐emptive rights allow minority shareholders to participate on the same 
terms.  Pre‐emptive  rights  are  available  in  the  US  only  if  the  corporation’s  charter  provide  for 
them523, while they are available by default in many other important jurisdictions. 
2.3.2 Regulatory Mechanisms 
Regulatory  mechanisms  include  elements  of  both  corporate  law  (Section  2.3.2.1)  and 
securities law (Section 2.3.2.2). 
2.3.2.1 Corporate Law 
Corporate  law  protections  include  fiduciary  duties  (Section  2.3.2.1.1),  the  oppression 





care,  loyalty  and  good  faith524.  Director  liability  can  be  lead  to:  (1)  regulatory  or  administrative 
penalties,  (2) personal civil  liability or (3) criminal  liability525. Although fiduciary duties are a strong 
mechanism  to  hold  directors  responsible,  shareholders  need  to  enforce  their  rights  through 
derivative action, since directors are fiduciaries to the corporation and not to shareholders526.  
Following  the  business  judgment  rule,  the  courts  defer  to  directors  and  presume  that 
directors  act  in  good  faith  and  make  informed  decisions  that  are  in  the  best  interests  of  the 
corporation527. High‐ranking managers of  the corporation528, as well as  controlling  shareholders529, 





First,  the  duty  of  care  requires  directors  to  demonstrate  “that  amount  of  care  which 
ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances”531. However, there seem to 
be  very  few  cases  (possibly  as  few  as  a  dozen532)  involving  straight  vanilla  cases  of  director 
‘negligence’, in part due to the strong influence of the business judgment rule, but also since most of 
the  cases  deal  additionally with  conflicts  of  interest  or  self‐dealing.  For  this  reason,  one  observer 
mentions  it  is  like searching for needles  in a haystack533. The classic reference case  is Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, where a board was deemed negligent by founding its decision to accept a particular price in 
a leveraged buy‐out based on a 20‐minute oral presentation and without outside consultation534. In 






“fully  informed”  (i.e.  the  board must  present  all material  facts)537.  Second,  directors  can  take  out 
D&O  insurance  to  shield  themselves  from  costs  of  fiduciary  duty  litigation538,  weakening  the 
effectiveness of the shareholder lawsuit as a disciplining mechanism or threat. Third, state law may 








duty  of  care  typically  engages  “the  board  as  a  whole”,  more  often  than  not,  the  duty  of  loyalty 
engages  only  one  particular  director542.  Bainbridge  notes  that  judges  are  less  inclined  to  apply 
judicial  deference  rule with  the  duty  of  loyalty  than with  the  duty  of  care,  since  judges  are  “less 
concerned about destroying internal team relationships” since only one director is concerned543. Of 
course,  it  also  remains  possible  that  a  few  directors  on  a  board,  or  even  the  whole  board  (for 
example, if they vote on a pet project that clearly does not serve the interests of the corporation), 
collectively violate their duty of  loyalty. Directors can try to  find  immunity through three avenues, 
corresponding  to  the  three  exceptions  presented  in  DGCL  art  144:  (1)  board  approval,  (2) 
shareholder  approval,  or  (3)  fairness.  First,  if  the  director  gets  his  decision  approved  by  a 
disinterested  board majority,  the  court  will  defer  to  the  business  judgment  of  the  well‐informed 
board. Second, shareholder approval of the conflicted decision will limit judicial review of the breach 
and can shift the burden to the attacking party rather than to the director544. Such state law again 







Now,  let  us  again  take  the  key  issue  of  executive  compensation  to  see  how  easily 
shareholders in the US can use litigation based on fiduciary duties to contest excess compensation. 
Shareholders  can  sue  the  board  over  breach  of  fiduciary  duties  to  control  self‐dealing.  However, 
litigation  to  curb  excessive  pay  seems  quasi  impossible,  due  to  both  substantive  and  procedural 
constraints.  Substantively,  courts  will  show  deference,  citing  the  business  judgment  rule  and 
satisfying  themselves with  only  basic  requirements,  such  as  review by  independent  directors  or  a 









study  also  shows  that  even  this  motive  has  not  yielded  any  appellate  court  decisions  to  reduce 









of  a  duty  of  management  and  oversight556,  general  fiduciary  duties,  and  other  statutory 
responsibilities.  We  will  focus  mainly  on  the  general  fiduciary  duties,  which  can  be  further 
decomposed into duties to (1) uphold the law557, (2) act honestly and in good faith, with a view to 
the  best  interests  of  the  corporation”558  and  (3)  act  with  competence,  care,  prudence  and 
diligence559. 
First,  the duty  to uphold  the  law  implies  that  the  fiduciary will  respect not only  the CBCA 
laws  and  rules,  but  also  the  articles,  by‐laws  and  unanimous  shareholder  agreement  of  the 
corporation. Also,  subject  to unanimous shareholder agreement  rules  (when shareholders  take on 







imply  several  more  specific  obligations561,  including:  maintaining  confidentiality  of  information, 
disclosing  material  facts  to  the  corporation,  making  informed  decisions,  keeping  an  independent 
judgment, avoiding conflicts of  interest, not  competing with  the corporation,  seeking approval  for 






consider  stakeholder  interests  is  also  echoed  in  the BCE  case565, where  the  court  judged  that  the 
duty  of  directors  to  act  in  the  best  interest  of  the  corporation  implied  the  consideration  of  the 
interests  of  the  firm’s  debenture  holders,  “not  only  their  legal  rights  but  also  their  reasonable 
expectations”566.  BCE  also  states  that  the  fiduciary  duty  of  the  directors  to  the  corporation  is  a 
“broad,  contextual  concept  […]  not  confined  to  short‐term  profit  or  share  value”567.  The 
jurisprudential  turnaround,  which  started  with  the  opinion  of  Judge  Berger  in  Teck568  and  was 
recently  consecrated  in  the  two high‐profile Supreme Court decisions Peoples  and BCE  (as we will 
discuss  in detail  later),  is  inspired by the Commonwealth jurisprudence and also the American Law 
Institute’s Principle of Corporate Governance569, which all allow directors and managers to take into 
account  the  stakes  of  employees,  creditors,  suppliers  and  other  groups  when  making  decisions. 
While  the  standard  of  appreciation  of  the  “best  interests  of  the  corporation”  rule was  previously 
deeply  rooted  in  the  maximization  of  the  corporation’s  share  price,  recent  jurisprudence  leaves 
managers with  the  need  to  factor  the  interests  of multiple  stakeholders  in  their  decision‐making. 
That  said,  by  eliminating  the  clear,  mathematical  and  one‐dimensional  yardstick  of  shareholder 
value,  the court seemed to have emptied the duty of much of  its meaning,  following the principle 
that  a  body  that  is  responsible  to  everyone  is  in  fact  responsible  to  no‐one570.  Directors  can  also 
theoretically  hide  behind  this  multi‐party  model  to  favour  one  stakeholder  rather  than  another, 
justifying their choice with a trade‐off analysis.  
Third,  the  duty  to  act  with  competence,  care  and  diligence  circumscribes  the  decision‐
making  ability  and process  used by directors.  The  “competence” portion of  the duty,  prior  to  the 
Peoples  decision,  imposed  a  responsibility  to  the  director  that  was  proportional  to  his  personal 
baggage  of  expertise  or  knowledge571.  This  subjective  test  was  established  in  UK  cases  Re  City 
Equitable Fire Insurance Co and Re Brazilian Rubber Plantantion and confirmed in Canadian decisions 
Soper  c. Canada, Lassonde c. Canada, Edison c. Canada  and others572. With Peoples,  the Canadian 
court  implemented  a  new  objective  competence  test  that  focuses  on  the  analysis  of  the  specific 
facts  and  circumstances  surrounding  the decision,  rather  than on  the background of  the director. 
The  interpretation of  the  “care  and diligence”  is  also now  subject  to  an objective  test, where  the 
court  seeks  to determine  if  the director acted as a  reasonable “prudent person” would  in “similar 




making  decisions  (again  considering  many  facts  such  as  the  costs  of  acquiring  information,  the 
timeframe  of  the  decision,  the  nature  of  the  decision,  the  variety  of  sources  of  the  information 
collected, the collection of information from management, the consultation of experts, etc…)575, as 
well  as  the  director’s  role  in  setting  up  governance  and  control  systems  to  provide  adequate 
information  for  decision‐making  and  supervision576.  In  summary,  although  there  has  been  some 
controversy  in  the  past  about  the  standard  of  review  of  director  duties,  McGuiness  states  that: 
“What  is now clear  is  that  the director  is  to be assessed according to an objective standard”577.  In 
general,  it  seems  the  objective  standard  is  positive  news  for  shareholders,  since  it  adds  a 
standardized benchmark of action, promotes an analysis based on specific facts, and reduces the risk 
of directors evading liability through loopholes of the subjective tests. 
Across all of these duties, but especially for the third one,  it  is  important to recall that the 
court will generally ponder its analysis using the business judgment rule. The court does not expect 
that the directors make perfect decisions, or even the best decision possible. They expect directors 
to make  reasonable  and  informed  decisions  given  the  facts  available  at  the  time  of  the  decision. 




In  the  US,  there  is  no  explicit  oppression  remedy  available  to  shareholders,  although 
McGuiness  states  that  “an  extensive  body  of  case  law  has  evolved  in  which  a  high  standard  of 




directors579,  even  in  the  absence  of  fraud  or  illegality580.  McGuiness  notes  that  it  has  recently 






their  shares  at  a  given  price  after  the  purchase  of  a warehouse583.  As McGuiness  notes,  95%+  of 
cases implicate private companies and the claimant is a minority shareholder in 70% of cases584. By 








and debtholders  have  the  remedial  tools  to  take  a  run  at  a  board of  directors”586,  implying  some 
limits  for  other  stakeholders  to  access  to  the  oppression  remedy.  Art  241  of  the  CBCA  supplies  a 
non‐exhaustive  list of 14  remedial actions  that confer meaningful power  to  the courts. Courts can 
not  only  order  redress  for  the  prejudicial  conduct,  but  can  also  implicate  themselves  in  the 
governance of the corporation to prevent further wrongdoing in the future. That said, as McGuiness 
points  out,  the  oppression  remedy  remains  subordinated  to  the  business  judgement  rule  and  is 
ineffectual  in  cases  of  “mere  incompetence  in  management  (unwise,  inefficient  or  careless 
performance of duties)”587. Rather, it requires “real evidence of misconduct”588.  
In Quebec,  this  remedy  is  not  directly  available  in  statutory  corporate  law,  although  the 
tribunal  seems  to  be  leaning  towards  its  jurisprudential  development589.  From  a  study  of  71 
oppression conflict cases  from 1995 to 2001,  it appears that  the oppression motive was used only 
8% of the time in public corporations, and 92% of the time in close corporations590. A key reason that 
oppression  is  used  mainly  in  the  context  of  close  corporations  is  that  shareholders  do  not  have 
access  to  a  liquid  secondary  market  to  exit  their  investment,  like  those  of  widely‐held 
corporations591.  Crête detects that Quebec judges seek to interpret oppression‐type conflicts in two 
different lights: (1) either in the light of concepts of good faith, equity and abuse592 causing prejudice 
to  personal  interests  of  shareholders  or  (2)  in  the  light  or  of  the  fiduciary  duties  of  directors  to 
defend the interest of shareholders593. In both options, judges try to draw parallels to law concepts 
received in Quebec corporate law, like good faith and the fiduciary duties of directors. That said, the 
inheritance by  the Quebec  judicial  system of  the powers  to  interpret  “equity”  claims  seem highly 
questionable,  despite  the  influential  1973  UK  judgement  Ebrahimi  v.  Westbourne  Galleries594. 
Furthermore,  a  particularly  difficult  dichotomy  to  reconcile  emerges  between  the  protection  of 
individual  interests with “equity” concept and the widely‐accepted business judgement rule, which 
clearly  states  that  the  courts  will  only  interfere  in  limited  circumstances  that  do  not  include 









A direct action  is brought by a shareholder to repair an  individual  injury not shared by the 
other shareholders597, while a derivative action is “an action brought in the name or on behalf of a 
corporation or any of its subsidiaries […] by a shareholder or other complainants, to assert or defend 





and managers,  equity  allowed  him  to  step  into  the  corporation’s  shoes”599.  Derivative  action was 
created  in  the  spirit  of  countering  implementation difficulties  of  the Foss  v. Harbottle  rule600.  The 
rule, which stems from the famous 1843 decision in the UK, stipulates that only a corporation may 
seek to recover damages caused to it. Although McGuiness states that the rule “makes perfect sense 




directors  are  the  wrongdoers.  […]  In  one  way  or  another,  some  means  must  be  found  for  the 




In  the  US,  direct  suits  have  dealt  with  issues  like  oppression  of  minority  shareholders, 
reorganizations,  special  dividends,  inspection  rights,  pre‐emptive  rights  and  voting  rights603. 
Derivative  suits  have  dealt  with  issues  like  corporate mismanagement,  fraud,  waste  of  corporate 




generated  benefits  for  all  shareholders.  Derivative  litigation  in  the  US  presents  a  number  of 
procedural  aspects,  such  as  verification  of  the  conflict,  stock  ownership  by  the  plaintiff,  and  the 
quality  of  the  shareholder  as  an  ‘adequate  representative’606.  However,  the  most  important  and 
contentious  aspect  is  the  “demand  requirement”607  that  forces  shareholders  to  ask  permission  to 
the board to bring the suit in the name of the corporation. As Bainbridge advances, the key question 
is “who gets to control the litigation: the shareholder or the board of directors”608. If directors allow 
shareholders  to bring  forward  suits  that  the board has  chosen not  to pursue  (perhaps because of 
some internal wrongdoing), the problematic situation occurs  if directors are also able to terminate 
the  shareholder  claim before  it  is  ever heard.  If  the  corporation  refuses  the demand,  the plaintiff 
must then “bare the burden of proving the refusal was wrongful”609. The demand requirement can 
be  excused  by  the  courts  in  cases  of  demand  “futility”,  a  standard  that  is  interpreted  differently 
according  to  state  law. However,  it  is  generally  invoked when  a  board  is  interested,  conflicted  or 
acting irrationally610. According to Bainbridge, “if demand is required, the shareholder has very little 
prospect of success”611, increasing the importance of proving futility at the outset. Even when futility 








derivative  action  is  “always  a  class  action  brought  or  conducted  in  a  representative  capacity  and 
therefore it is binding for all shareholders, not just the complainant”614. In other words, a derivative 
action should be brought about  to defend collective  rights, not  simply  the  individual  rights of one 
shareholder. Derivative  actions  seems  to  confer  remedy  for  shareholders  in  a wide‐ranging  list  of 
scenarios:  “loss  in  share  value,  loss  of  employment,  loss  of  business  opportunity,  slander  of  title, 
improvident administration, failure to account, additional liability of the plaintiff under a guarantee 
or  indemnity, breach of  fiduciary duty, and all other  claims  that may be properly  characterized as 
“consequential”  in  the sense that  they  flowed from the damage caused to  the corporation,  rather 
than from damages, injury or loss caused to the plaintiff directly”615. 
In Quebec, this remedy is not directly available in statutory corporate law, except by  way of 
jurisprudential  interpretation  or  by  the  limited  scope  of  article  316  of  the  Civil  Code,  which  only 
permits the remedy in cases of fraud (a higher barrier than the CBCA)616. 
2.3.2.1.4 Piercing the Corporate Veil 
Piercing  (or  lifting)  the  corporate  veil  allows  the  tribunal  to  see  beyond  the  distinct  legal 




In  the  US,  piercing  of  the  veil  is  controversial  and  highly  litigated618,  mainly  due  to  the 
absence  of  bright  line  rules  for  judicial  interpretation  and  the  reliance  on  common  law 
jurisprudence619. The criteria  test used  to pierce  the veil, which problematically varies significantly 
across  state  jurisdictions,  typically  rests on  the core notions of:  "unity of  interest and ownership", 
"wrongful conduct" and "proximate cause"620. In terms of unity of interest and ownership, the court 
typically seeks to prove that the firm is used as “alter ego”, “corporate dummy” or “instrumentality” 
for  the  shareholder621.  Judges  rely  on  a  list  of  20+  factors  (which  Bainbridge  calls  the  “laundry 




applied through  jurisprudence. The main cause of application  is when the corporation  is used as a 




In Quebec,  lifting  of  the  corporate  veil was  codified  in  article  317  of  the  1994  Civil  Code, 
establishing more defined contours to more than a century of jurisprudential evolution626. It aims to 
prevent  fraud,  abusive  behaviour  or  actions  contrary  to  public  order  committed  by  shareholders. 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The  central  element  is  the  qualification  of  the  relationship  between  the  shareholder  and  the 
corporation. It is only when the shareholder can be qualified as the corporation’s “alter ego” that his 
personal responsibility is to be engaged, typically through (1) control of the corporation’s assets or 
(2)  legal  control  over  the  corporation627.  According  to  Rousseau  and  Smaili,  there  are  2  core 
applications  of  article  317:  (1)  when  the  shareholder  manipulates  the  corporation  to  legitimize 
fraud, abusive behaviour or actions contrary to public order, and where the act  in question would 
have been illegal without the juxtaposition of the corporation, and (2) where the shareholder uses 
the corporation as an  intermediary  to commit  fraud, abusive behaviour or actions contrary  to  the 
public order,  in his personal  interest  and without engaging his personal  responsibility628.  It  should 
come as  no  surprise  that  this  remedy,  in Quebec,  is  almost  unanimously  used by  shareholders  of 
close corporations629. According to Rousseau’s study of 220 “veil” decisions between 1994 and 2004, 
which  accrue  at  a  rate  of  perhaps  20‐30  per  year,  the  “lifting”  rate  was  about  34%  in  Quebec, 
compared to 40% in the US and 47% in the UK. Despite the new codification, Rousseau comments 
that the contours of this remedy are still flexible, remarking that Judge Cardozo’s 1926 remark about 
the  “mist”  surrounding  the  metaphor  of  the  lifting  of  the  veil  is  still  present  today630.  Some 
commentators observe that the lifting of the corporate veil is an unpredictable recourse that further 
jeopardizes  the  legal  personality  of  the  corporation631  through  the  “anarchist  erosion”  of  this  key 






binding  obligations  and  important  disclosure  requirements  on  corporate  directors  and  officers, 
relating to both primary and secondary market transactions633.  
In  the  US,  security  law  is  of  federal  competence  and  is  enforced  by  the  SEC,  yet  state 
corporate law also applies to certain major transactions involving securities, like takeovers.  
In  Canada,  while  security  law  was  usually  of  provincial  competence,  recent  efforts  have 





In  the US,  Rule 10b(5) on  the Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Practices  states 
that Insiders may not make deceitful trades based on material non‐public information. Rather, under 
the  “equal  access  theory”,  Insiders  must  abstain  or  disclose  the  information.  Plaintiffs  have  the 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burden  of  proving  materiality,  manipulation/deception,  and  the  context  of  a  securities 
transaction635. 
In  Canada,  Section  131  of  the  CBCA  has  similar  insider  trading  provisions,  which  can  be 
supplemented  when  applicable  by  the  Criminal  Code,  provincial  corporate  law  and  provincial 
securities  authorities.  More  general  self‐dealing  rules  also  exist  to  protect  shareholders.  For 
example,  multilateral  instrument  61‐101  on  the  Protection  of  Minority  Shareholders  in  Special 
Transactions  (replacing  Ontario’s  61‐501  and  Quebec’s  Q‐27  instruction)  imposes  particular 
procedural  steps  during  related‐party  transactions  to  protect  minority  shareholders,  such  as 
additional disclosure and shareholder participation in the review of the transaction636.  
2.3.2.2.2 Takeover Rules 
Perhaps  the  largest difference between  the US and Canada  is  that,  following  the Santa Fe 
Industries decision637, the competence in takeover rules in the US lies not in the SEC at the federal 
level, but rather in state corporate law638. 
In  the  US,  takeovers  are  subject  to  mandatory  disclosure  of  cash  tender  offers,  an 
alternative to proxy contests, under  the Williams Act at  the  federal  level639.   Reviews of  takeovers 
rely  more  on  director  duties  than  mandatory  rules640.  When  directors  are  interested  in  the 
transaction,  the  level  of  review  of  the  takeover  will  likely  increase,  with  such  tests  as  “Entire 












Market  mechanisms  that  protect  shareholders  include  stock  sale  (Section  2.3.3.1), 








Shareholders  also  have  the  option  to  diversify  their  holdings  to mitigate  a  particular  risk. 
This is possible since they will own typically a small share of one or more widely‐held firms. On the 




of  dissatisfied  shareholders  to  become  active  in  corporate  governance.  In  other  words,  “when 
monitors can easily ‘exit’ the firm they tend not to exercise their voice”648. It has been advanced by 
many  commentators  that  the  highly  liquid  US  markets  may  be  a  core  reason  why  institutional 
monitoring is weak649. 
2.3.3.2 Concentration 
The  opposite  of  a  stock  sale,  buying  more  stock,  is  another  market  mechanism  for  the 
shareholder  to  consider.  While  small  shareholders  are  often  “frozen  out”  of  corporate 
governance650,  they  can  typically  exert  more  influence  as  the  size  of  the  ownership  holding 
increases. For example, their effectiveness at jawboning management increases651. 
Obviously,  institutional  investors  are  concentrated  shareholders  of  the  companies  in  their 
portfolio. Beyond  that, as we have seen,  institutional  investors can collaborate or  league  together 
(with some  limitations, especially  in  the US)  to  increase their power to discipline  Insiders. Such an 
example  is  the CCGG coalition  in Canada, with 40+  financial  institutions as members  representing 
more than $1 trilliion in assets652. 
There  is  also  some  evidence  that  concentration  can  lead  to  better  governance  at  a 
market/ecosystem level. MacIntosh mentions that “a growing body of empirical  literature suggests 
that  concentrated ownership  is  likely  to enhance  firm value”653.  That  said,  growing bigger  is not a 
panacea.  Rousseau  advances  that  concentration may  have  the  effect  of  shifting  vertical  conflicts 




When  agency  costs  related  to  poor  governance  result  in  a  depressed  share  price,  third 
parties are often likely to step in and try to take control of the firm if they believe they can readily 
rectify  the  situation654.  In  other  words,  "takeovers  are  useful  both  because  they  reduce  the 
informational monopoly of  the  incumbent manager  about  the  state of  the  firm and because  they 
allow  for  the  replacement  of  inefficient  managers”655.  Takeovers  also  usually  result  in  one‐time 
abnormal returns for the target shareholder. 
The  takeover  market  will  provide  an  incentive  to  Insiders  to  reduce  their  opportunistic 
behavior  or  risk  being  ousted.  This  threat  is  usually  more  valid  for  widely‐held  firms,  where  a 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reputational  risk,  especially  if  it  is  possible  they  will  be  returning  to  the  external  job  market  for 
future  employment.    They  will  also  limit  opportunistic  behaviour  if  they  perceive  they  are  in  a 
competition with other internal managers or directors to retain the position of control661. 
 
In addition  to  the  four mechanisms examined above,  there are a number of other market 
mechanisms  that  can  curb  Insider opportunism. Among  them, product markets  and  the press  can 
provide threats or discipline to Insiders. That said, the strength of the threat is generally low662.  
Perhaps then the most important takeaway of Part 2 is that three key types of mechanisms 
interact  to  curb  Insider  opportunism:  internal  governance,  regulatory  and market.  In many ways, 
market mechanisms  are  the  default  forces  in  play,  while  regulatory mechanisms  are  a  safeguard 
when internal governance and market mechanisms fail.  
In  the  ideal  free‐market  conception  of  business,  internal  governance  and  market 
mechanisms would be strong, and the regulatory remedies would need to be few and exceptional. 










Realizing  that  building  a  one‐size‐fits‐all  regulatory  framework  that  would  provide  for 
optimal power equilibria for all  firms  is  likely  impossible,  it  is nonetheless critical to question what 






as  lying  somewhere  between  the  poles  of managerial  discretion  and  shareholder  power.  Can we 
somehow infer that one of these two models is superior? If this cannot be determined, can we find 
that one model  is better suited to the specific context of a country? For example, as La Porta and 
Kraakman  have  hinted,  could  a  “shareholder  power”  model  be  better  suited  to  developing 
economies, while a “managerial discretion” model be better suited to large mature economies? 
Let  us  note  that  this  dilemma  can  also  be  viewed  under  Bainbridge’s  well‐known model: 
authority and accountability.  In his model,  the authority of  the board  to  create value  for  the  firm 
must  be  balanced  with  a  need  for  accountability  to  the  shareholder  owners  of  the  corporation. 
Perhaps Bainbridge’s most  interesting contribution  is  to note  that,  in  the end, both objectives can 
never  be  fully  reconciled.  Increasing  authority  necessarily  reduces  accountability.  In  other words, 
there  is always a  trade‐off. Every proposed regulatory  framework  thus needs  to be appreciated  in 
terms  of  the  authority  and  accountability  trade‐off,  or  in  terms  of  the managerial  discretion  and 
shareholder power trade‐off. 
While the search for convergence and optimality across jurisdictions is better left to expert 
scholars  like  Kraakman,  there  is  one  generally  shared  consensus:  elements  of  both  poles  are 
required. Trying to understand how to achieve this right balance is the subject of Part 3. 
3.1 Why Reform: The Case for Strengthening Protections for Outsiders 
Pursuant  to  our  analysis  in  Part  1  and  2,  we  will  argue  that  the  rights  and  remedies  of 





Perhaps  the most basic argument  for protecting  shareholders  is  that  their powers are  too 
weak or  insufficient against  Insiders who wish to do harm. In  its most general form, this argument 
recalls the populist credo of protecting the mass from the powerful few who wield influence. Berle 
and Means introduce this argument in The Modern Corporation:  











“If  the  interests of management do not  fully overlap with those of shareholders, management thus 
cannot  be  automatically  counted  on  to  take  actions  that  would  serve  shareholder  interests.  As  a 
result, agency costs that reduce shareholder value might arise”665. 
In  Part  2,  we  have  examined  in  some  depth  a  number  of  conflicts  (such  as  executive 
compensation,  self‐dealing  and  major  transactions)  where  Insiders  are  able  to  capture  power  in 
order to obtain  important private benefits, extract rents and reduce shareholder value. Firm value 
would necessarily be higher absent these diversions and inefficient transactions. 
At  an  empirical  level,  the  evidence  for  the  link  between  good  corporate  governance  and 
higher  firm value  is modestly strong. One of  the studies most strongly affirming the value of good 
governance  is  the  2003  paper  by  Gompers,  Ishii  and Metrick666,  which  reported  that  “companies 
with strong shareholder rights had higher annual returns, profits, and sales growth than companies 
with weak  shareholder  rights”667.  The  2004  study  by  Bebchuk,  Cohen  and  Ferrell668  also  indicates 
that six pro‐Insider corporate governance provisions reducing the power of shareholders (staggered 




performance.  Finally,  there  are  the  landmark  studies  from  La  Porta  et  al  on  the  link  between 
shareholder  protections  and  firm  value.  In  their  2002  study  Investor  Protection  and  Corporate 
Valuation analyzing 539 firms  in 27 countries, La Porta et al conclude that “firms  in countries with 
better  shareholder  protection  have  higher  Tobin’s  Q  [measuring  firm  value]  than  do  firms  in 
countries with inferior protection”671.  
Second, increased shareholder power should in theory result in more liquid capital markets. 
Better  shareholder  protections  should  make  shareholders  more  willing  to  invest  their  capital  in 





with  better  legal  protection,  more  of  the  firm’s  profits  would  come  back  to  them  as  interest  or 
dividends as opposed  to being expropriated by  the entrepreneur who controls  the  firm. By  limiting 
expropriation,  the  law raises the price that securities  fetch  in the marketplace.  In turn,  this enables 
more  entrepreneurs  to  finance  their  investments  externally,  leading  to  the  expansion  of  financial 
markets”672.   
La  Porta  et  al  also  provide  empirical  evidence  that  better  shareholder  protections  lead  to 
more liquid capital markets, which they survey in their 1999 paper Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance673.  In  their 1998 paper Law and Finance674  and  their 1999  study Corporate Ownership 
Around  the  World675  surveying  27  countries,  La  Porta  et  al  find  that  economies  with  very  good 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shareholder protection  facilitate  the dispersion of capital and the emergence of widely‐held  firms. 




It  seems  legitimate  to  briefly  review  the  general  risks  and  dangers  of  the  corporate 
governance  reforms  that  propose  to  increase  shareholder  power.  The  case  against  can  be 
summarized  by  the  following  arguments:  (1)  the  Darwinian  evolutionary  perspective,  (2)  the 
increased decision‐making costs,  (3)  strategic hold‐ups,  (4)  the potential  for excessive power,  risk‐
taking and opportunism, (5) the marginal benefit of change, and (6) the incertitude of alternatives. 
First,  the  most  persuasive  argument  for  keeping  the  status  quo  of  an  equilibrium  tilted 
towards managerial discretion  is probably  the Darwinian evolutionary perspective,  in either of  its 
two variations on the theme of “survival of the fittest”. Roe nicely introduces this perspective: 
“In  the  classic  story,  the  large  public  firm  survived  because  it  best  balanced  the  problems  of 




The  first  variation  of  the  “survival  of  the  fittest”  story  would  advance  that  since  the  US 
economy has survived and thrived, and is likely the most prosper in the world, managerial discretion 
is likely the fittest approach to governing firms.  
The  second  variation  would  advance  that  since  the  board  of  directors  has  survived  and 
thrived,  and  has  become  the  central  decision‐making  institution  of  the  firm,  it  is  likely  the  fittest 
body  to govern  firms.  In  this view of  the world, we need  to believe  that  since boards have better 
information,  deeper  expertise  and  a  higher  similarity  of  interests  than  shareholders,  they  are  the 















Second,  Increased  shareholder  power  will  usually  imply  increased  decision‐making  costs. 
Shareholder  decision‐making  expands  the  role  of  the  shareholder  in  the  governance  of  the  firm, 
which  is  not  necessarily  desirable.  As we  have  seen,  the  Board  is  a  particularly  efficient  decision‐
making  body,  given  its  better  information,  deeper  expertise  and  similarity  of  interests682.  As 
Kraakman notes, “shareholder‐level protections are often more effective, but also more costly than 
board‐level protections. But  the more effective  the board  is  in serving shareholder’s  interests,  the 
fewer  the  decisions  that  should  require  shareholder  action”683.  Shareholders,  if  left  to  their  own 
devices, may also do the wrong thing or be otherwise inefficient684. It seems the right balancing act 
requires  careful  selection  of  the  types  of  decisions  that  merit  larger  shareholder  involvement, 
considering  both  the  likelihood  of  Insiders  to  abuse  authority  and  the  ability  of  shareholders  to 
intervene efficiently in such a decision. 
Third,  increased  shareholder  power  may  create  strategic  hold‐ups.  A  manifestation  of 
increased shareholder power typically is the requirement that key decisions be approved by a higher 




right  balancing  act  requires  the  ability  for  firms  to  set  their  own  voting  thresholds  based  on  the 
specific  composition  of  their  ownership  structure,  weighing  the  need  to  give  a  voice  to minority 
shareholders and the need to eliminate value‐destroying blocking of efficient transactions. 
Fourth,  increased  shareholder  power  may  lead  to  excess  power,  risk‐taking  and 
shareholder opportunism.  In essence,  it may create a governance dynamic that reflects the short‐
term capital appreciation goals of shareholders more than the board’s  long‐term strategic plan for 




shareholder‐driven management  in general,  if  shareholders can capture  the  rewards of  risk‐taking 
but society bares  its costs  (ex: employees  lose their  jobs  in the event of bankruptcy).  It seems the 
right balancing act may require  the ability  for shareholder representation  in management through 
corporate  elections,  but  having  a  strong  counterbalance  of  disinterested  directors  to  rein  in 
opportunistic decision‐making. 
Fifth, the marginal benefit argument is often cited by proponents of managerial discretion. 
They note  that  the US  is already  very democratic and pro‐shareholder and  that Canada  is already 
“one of the most democratic corporate law regimes of any of the world’s major industrial states (in 
the  sense  that  it  is  responsive  to  shareholders  voting  a majority  of  voting  shares)”688.  Critics  will 
therefore question  the marginal benefit of  sliding  the equilibrium even more  towards shareholder 










need  for  managerial  authority  to  effectively  run  firms.  However,  we  defend  that  the  power 
equilibrium is still too largely dominated by managerial discretion.  
Of course, the degree to which the pendulum of power swings in favor of management is a 
corollary  of  the  ownership  structure.  As  we  have  seen,  corporations  with  more  concentrated 
ownership structures in Canada may confer less discretion to managers, relative to more widely‐held  
US counterparts, and thus reduce the power desequilibrium between shareholders and managers692.  
That  said,  improving  shareholder  protections  seems  warranted  to  produce  better 
governance outcomes, increase the value of firms and strengthen the liquidity of capital markets. 
Free markets,  it  seems,  cannot  alone  re‐establish  this  equilibrium.  As  our  study  in  Part  2 
reveals, market mechanisms offer  important, yet overall  incomplete, protections  for  shareholders. 
Even the staunchest proponents of free markets, like Adam Smith, concede that market forces alone 








“The  market  cannot  fill  the  regulatory  gaps  that  American‐style  enabling  corporate  law  leaves 
behind”694. 
Government  intervention  seems  a  necessary  force  to  re‐shape  the  corporate  governance 
landscape. However,  the  type of  intervention  is  key.  To  be  clear, we  are  not  proposing  increased 
government  intervention  in business. We rather propose the opposite: that government step  in to 
give additional powers  to agents  (especially  shareholders),  so  they can regulate  themselves. Auto‐
regulation can only be effective if agents have sufficient and credible power to defend their rights.  
Governments  can  seek  to  shape  the  corporate  governance  landscape mainly  by  affecting 
either (1) internal governance mechanisms or (2) regulatory mechanisms. One on hand, it can seek 
to  modify  the  basic  allocation  of  power  in  the  corporate  triad,  so  that  agents  are  increasingly 
capable of  resolving conflicts among  themselves  in a  flexible way. On  the other hand,  it  can  issue 




In  the  next  section,  we  argue  that  reforms  to  both  internal  governance  and  regulatory 
mechanisms  are  likely  necessary,  but  posit  that  the  former  type  may  generally  more  desirable. 
Giving  internal  governance  powers  to  agents  so  they  can  prevent  and  resolve  conflicts  among 
themselves, with minimal resort to the courts, seems consistent with the role of the corporation to 
simplify  business  exchanges  and  reduce  formalism.  That  said,  reforms  to  regulatory  mechanisms 
may  also be desirable  in  certain  areas  such  as  securities  law,  or when  the  reforms  aim  to modify 
internal  governance and  the basic  allocation of power  in  the  corporation.  For example, modifying 











In  this  section,  we  explore  in  more  detail  how  to  think  about  re‐shaping  the  power 
equilibrium  in  the  corporation,  and  how  to  do  so with  as  little  new mandatory  requirements  for 
corporations as possible. 
3.2.1 Crisis, Politics and Reform 
Corporate  governance  law  is  too  often  a  product  of  crisis.  The  content  of  corporate 
governance  reforms,  for  the  vast  majority,  is  not  dictated  by  a  steady  coherent  program  of 









of  the  20th  century.  Black  cites  two  colourful  illustrations  of  how  shareholder  power  was  dialled 
down in the US in favour of managerial discretion in regards to proxy rules: 
“One  purpose  of  the  [1934]  Proxy  Rules,  a  Senate  Report  explains,  was  to  protect  investors  from 
proxy  solicitations  by  “irresponsible  outsiders  seeking  to wrest  control  of  a  corporation  away  from 
honest and conscientious corporation officials”698.  




their paper Corporate Governance and Control, Becht et al  single out six events  that  influenced or 
directly contributed to corporate governance reform: (1) worldwide privatization of the 1980s and 
1990s, (2) pension fund reform and the growth of pension fund savings, (3) the takeover wave of the 




“It  is  based  on  the  notion  that  bandwagons  are  unavoidable,  but  their  motivating  impact  can  be 
leveraged and their bad effects alleviated by good statutory design”701. 
However, this energy must be harnessed in such a way that the reform does not become a 






Reform  efforts  in  time  of  crisis  are  also  particularly  vulnerable  to  the  influence  of  special 




“If  shareholder proposals begin  to win with any  frequency, managers will press  state  lawmakers  to 
change  the  structural  rules  in  the managers’  favor,  and  the  states may well  respond.  Antitakeover 
laws  show  this  process  at  work:  shareholders  voted  with  their  feet  in  favor  of  hostile  takeovers; 








“Some  major  reform  measures  were  “taken  off  the  shelf,”  so  to  speak,  and  modified  for  the 
occasion”705. 
Rousseau,  in  his  paper  on  Canadian  Corporate  Governance  Reform,  recalls  an  idea  from 
Baillie that  lawmaking should always seek to feed off regulatory requirements, rather than being a 
reaction to either a particular crisis or emerging trends:  
“Perhaps  the  most  serious  issue  underlying  [corporate  governance]  developments  and  related 
proposals is the extent to which changes in […] oversight mechanisms should be driven by legislative 
or  regulatory  requirements,  rather  than developing over  time  in  response  to emerging  commercial 
practice and community consensus”706.  
Clark pushes the idea of “good statutory design” further by proposing that lawmakers, even 





regulatory  changes  (or  existing  rules),  (2)  periodic  reassessment  of  regulations  in  light  of  such 











Corporations aim  to create value and be profitable.  In a more  formal way,  their goal  is  to 
provide  returns  for  shareholders.  As  we  recall  from  Nobel  laureates  Coase  and  Williamson,  the 
corporate  form  exists  as  a  nexus  of  contracts  to  minimize  information  and  transaction  costs 
compared with free‐market contracting. In other words, they exist because they are the simplest or 
most efficient way to conduct business. The author Ballantine summarizes well this perspective: 
“The  primary  purpose  of  corporation  laws  is  not  regulatory.  They  are  enabling  acts,  to  authorize 






limited  to creditors, employees, customers,  suppliers, as well as  the environment and society as a 
whole. According to governance scholars Monks and Minnow, half of the states in the US now have 
rules  that  permit  or  sometimes  require  the  consideration  of  stakeholder  interests709.  This  is  the 
debate  of  (1)  shareholder  primacy  vs.  (2)  stakeholder  theory.  This  debate  is  an  old  one,  but with 
modern importance. 
On  one  hand,  in  terms  of  shareholder  primacy,  one  of  the  earlier  cases  to  establish  the 
norm  of  maximizing  shareholder  wealth  was  the  1919  landmark  case  of  Dodge  vs.  Ford  Motor 
Company710.  The  Dodge  brothers  alleged  that  Henry  Ford  diverted  profits  to  employees  and 








Among  the  first academic  studies on  the  topic was a 1932 debate between scholars Berle 
and  Dodd  via  a  series  of  short  articles  in  the  pages  of  the  Harvard  Law  Review,  where  Berle 
advocated shareholder primacy and Dodd pushed for the stakeholder model712. While the “generally 
accepted  historical  picture  puts  Berle  in  the  position  of  the  original  ancestor  of 
today's shareholder primacy position”713, a recent paper by Bratton and Wachter demonstrates that 
Berle’s  position  was  indeed more  nuanced,  more  balanced  and  evolved  significantly  over  time  – 
even ultimately recognizing the merits of the stakeholder view714. In his article Corporate Powers as 
Powers  in  Trust  (1931)715,  Berle  takes  a  clear  position  in  favor  of  the  shareholder  primacy model, 
arguing  that  management  should  work  for  shareholders.  However,  in  the  classic  The  Modern 





“Had  the  book  closed  with  this  appeal  for  a  shareholder  trust  model,  it  could  stand  today  as  an 





Bratton  and  Wachter  note  that  The  Modern  Corporation  and  Private  Property  “captures 
Berle in the middle of his metamorphosis from friend of shareholders to advocate of the corporation 
as an instrument for furthering national social welfare policy”717. Indeed, in Book IV Chapter 1 of the 
book,  Berle  and  Means  argue  that  the  separation  of  ownership  and  control  has  “destroyed  the 




Nobel  laureate  Ronald  Coase  (1937)  also  supported  shareholder  primacy  in  his  famous 
article The Nature of the Firm, but based his support on the argument that the corporation is a nexus 
of  contracts  built  on  top of  shareholder  capital  seeking  to minimize  transaction  costs  transaction. 
Nobel  laureate  Milton  Friedman  (1970),  one  of  the  most  fervent  advocates  of  the  norm  of 
maximizing shareholder wealth, famously declared that "the only social responsibility of business is 
to  increase their profits”719. The work of  Jensen & Meckling (1972), Alchian & Demsetz  (1972) and 
Fama & Jensen (1983) on the principal‐agent relationships reaffirmed the primacy of shareholders. 
By  observing  that  managers  had  a  mandate  to  manage  on  behalf  of  shareholders  (the  “residual 
claimants”),  they found that maximizing shareholder wealth should be the central objective of  the 
corporation.  In a  later  study,  Jensen  found  further  support  for  the  single objective of  shareholder 





century  that  Hansmann  and  Kraakman  concluded  that  it  represented  the  “end  of  history”  for 
corporate  law:  “Since  the  dominant  corporate  ideology  of  shareholder  primacy  is  unlikely  to  be 
undone,  its  success  represents  the  end  of  history  for  corporate  law”721.  Their  anointment  of  the 
shareholder model as the “standard model” can also be explained partially by the historical failures 
of  other  models,  such  as  the  manager‐oriented  model,  the  labor‐oriented  model  and  the  State‐
oriented model722. Their conclusion relative to shareholder primacy was to this effect: 
“Ultimate control over  the corporation should  rest with  the shareholder class;  the managers of  the 
corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the corporation  in the  interests of  its 










now, as a consequence of both  logic and experience,  there  is convergence on a consensus that  the 
best means  to  this end  ‐‐  the pursuit of  aggregate  social welfare  ‐‐  is  to make corporate managers 
strongly accountable to shareholder interests, and (at least in direct terms) only to those interests”724. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  terms  of  stakeholder  theory,  the  influential  work  of  Freeman  and 
McVea  (1984)  stressed  the  concept  of multi‐objectivity  and  defined  the  norm of  consideration  of 
stakeholder interests as follows: 
The  stakeholder  framework  does  not  rely  on  a  single  overriding  management  objective  for  all 
decisions. As such it provides no rival to the traditional aim of “maximizing shareholder wealth.” To 
the contrary, a stakeholder approach rejects the very idea of maximizing a single‐objective function as 




corporations  were  cities,  towns,  universities,  hospitals  or  other  institutions  with  a  similar  social 
mission. Millon also recalls the social roots of corporations: 
During the first part of the nineteenth century, each instance of incorporation required a special act 
of  the state  legislature, and only stakeholders mattered. As a creation of  the state,  the corporation 
was viewed as a socially useful instrument for the state to carry out its public policy goals and as an 
entity whose powers must be kept in check. The legal norm was the ultra vires doctrine, which limited 
the  ability  of  a  corporation  to  pursue  activities  beyond  its  original  charter  or  state  of 
incorporation”727. 
Lynn  Stout  and  Margaret  Blair,  two  staunch  advocates  of  the  stakeholder  model,  find 
recognition  of  the  stakeholder  model  in  what  they  term  the  “team  production  theory”,  where 
“equity  investors  are  not  the  only  group  whose  resources  can  be  converted  into  firm  specific 
assets”728.  They  also  cite  evidence  that  state  corporate  law  recognizes  today  specific  situations 
where stakeholder interests should or must be considered by directors and officers: 
“As  I  have pointed out  in writings with Margaret Blair,  courts  consistently permit directors  “to use 
corporate  funds  for charitable purposes;  to  reject business strategies  that would  increase profits at 
the expense of the local community; to avoid risky undertakings that would benefit shareholders’ at 
creditors’  expense;  and  to  fend  off  a  hostile  takeover  at  a  premium  price  in  order  to  protect 
employees or the community”729. 
Some jurisprudence also seems to back up the stakeholder theory. The Delaware Supreme 





“It  is  clear  that  the phrase  ‘the best  interests of  the  corporation’  should be  read not  simply as  the 






Lee  however  fails  to  find  in  the  court’s  decision  sufficiently  convincing  reasoning  to  overturn  the 
norm of shareholder primacy:  
“In  light of  the  legal position prior  to Peoples,  the  court's  legal  analysis  is unsatisfying.  Teck  is not, 
contrary  to  the  court's  suggestion,  exemplary  of  a  position  "long  recognized"  by  the  courts.  It  is  a 
solitary judicial endorsement, likely obiter, of a controversial legal proposition. Equally questionable is 
the court's reliance on Olympia & York”. […] 
“It  is  disappointing,  however,  that  the  Supreme  Court  did  not  deal  with  the  normative  issues 
underlying the legal debate about shareholder primacy. The court's silence on these issues would be 
unproblematic  if,  as  the  court's  opinion  implies,  the  legal  position  were  clear.  But  in  light  of  the 
inconclusiveness  of  the  prior  case  law,  the  court's  invocation  of  "long‐recognized"  principle  is 
unpersuasive as a justification of the court's choice”733. 











the  duty  to  maximize  shareholder  value  in  the  context  of  change‐of‐control  transactions  (the  so‐
called  Revlon  duty  derived  from Delaware  jurisprudence)  in  favour  of  a  nebulous  duty  to  treat  all 
affected stakeholders  fairly,  commensurate with “the corporation’s duties as a  responsible citizen.” 
By  requiring  the  directors  to  consider  the  interests  of  all  stakeholders,  the  effect  of  the  Court’s 
decision may  be  that  the  directors  become  legally  accountable  to  no  one  –  immunizing  directors’ 
substantive  decisions  from  legal  attack  provided  that  they  get  their  process  right  and  can make  a 
plausible business case on the basis of their view of the best interests of the corporation. As a result 
of the BCE decision, stakeholders seeking to challenge a directors’ decision in the courts will need to 
focus  on  the  process  whereby  the  decision  was  made,  rather  than  on  the  substance  of  the 
decision”735. 
In these decisions, we note a clear willingness of the courts to force managers to consider a 
broader  stakeholder  approach  of  corporate  law,  which  clashes  with  the  traditional  shareholder‐






commentators  argue  that  stakeholder  interests  should  simply  be  considered  as  part  of  the 
management style of the organization, while others take the stronger stance that management has 
the  legal  obligation  to  consider  stakeholder  interests  (and  that  the  courts  should  consider  this  a 
normative  standard  in  their  review  of  board  decisions).  For  this  reason,  many  observers  have 
attacked stakeholder theory, especially its lack of a clear mathematical way for managers to perform 
the  trade‐offs  between  various  stakeholders.  Jensen  in  particular  is  critical  of  the  stakeholder 
approach: 
“Because the advocates of stakeholder theory refuse to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs 






vest  increased power directly to shareholders, knowing this will  increase their  likelihood of getting 
an  appropriate  return  on  their  investment.  In  a  broader  stakeholder  model,  it  appears  more 
debatable  whether  vesting  additional  powers  in  the  board  (who  in  theory  has  an  informed  360 
degree  view)  or  with  shareholders  (who  are  likely  more  self‐interested)  is  the  more  appropriate 
method to create better stakeholder outcomes. 
3.2.2.2 Legislator Objective (Permissive vs. Imperative framework) 




and capitalism, that  it believes are core to this development. As for democracy,  the  legislator may 
wish to promote a framework with equal opportunity for participants, where shareholders can use 
their  voting  right  to  enact  change  and  choose  leaders,  and where  sufficient  checks  and  balances 
exist so that the powerful minority in control does not oppress the majority. As for capitalism, the 
legislator may wish  to  promote  a  framework where  individuals  can  let  their  self‐interest  reign  to 
create value for society, where there are little hassles and red tape, and where good projects have 
easy access to capital. At the same‐time, this value creation must be accomplished in a responsible 
way.  Therefore,  the  legislator  must  also  seek  to  minimize  opportunistic  risks  associated  with 






“Corporate  law,  we  believe,  should  have  the  same  principal  goal  in  developed  and  emerging 
economies  ‐‐  succinctly  stated,  to  provide  governance  rules  that  maximize  the  value  of  corporate 
enterprises to investors”738. 
The  goal  of  the  legislator with  regards  to  corporate  law  could  therefore  be  simplified  to: 
maximizing the value of firms. 
In practice, to maximize the value of firms, the lawmaker must consider a number of trade‐
offs  and  strike  the  right  balance  between  authority  and  accountability,  and  between  shareholder 
and manager power. Kraakman offers what is perhaps the best description of this exercise: 
“Nonetheless,  it  is  possible  to  design  a  law  that  works  tolerably  well  –  that  vests  substantial 
decisionmaking  power  in  large  outside  shareholders, who have  incentives  to make  good decisions; 
that reduces, though it cannot eliminate, fraud and self‐dealing by corporate insiders; that minimizes, 
though  it  cannot  altogether  avoid,  the  need  for  official  enforcement  through  courts;  that  gives 
managers and controlling shareholders incentives to obey the rules even when they could often get 
away  with  ignoring  them;  that  reinforces  desirable  cultural  attitudes  about  proper  managerial 
behavior;  and  that  still  leaves managers with  the  flexibility  they need  to  take  risks and make quick 
decisions”739. 






law  to  ensure  that  abuses  will  not  be  repeated  in  the  future.  However,  is  such  mandatory 
rulemaking really warranted, or even efficient? 
Leading  scholars  contend  that  while  generally  the  “enabling”  approach  tends  to  create 
better  governance outcomes  and a healthier  governance  culture  long‐term  than  the  “mandatory” 




“While  acknowledging  that  market  instruments  may  not  play  an  effective  role  in  deterring  self‐
interested behaviour  in such a setting,  leading commentators tend to avoid proposing an expanded 
regulatory  role  for  corporate  law.  Thus,  after noting  that  legal mechanisms  such as  the oppression 
remedy and  securities  legislation  requirements protect minority  shareholders  to  some extent,  they 
tend  to  argue  that  further  concerns  about  concentrated ownership problems need not  lead  to  the 
enactment  of  new  mandatory  rules.  Instead,  government  policy  should  seek  to  enhance  the 
effectiveness  of  markets  in  the  governance  system,  for  instance,  by  fostering  the  disclosure  of 
information,  in  order  to  lead  them  to  exert  better  control  of  the  agency  problem  associated with 
concentrated ownership”740.  




















served  by  it  either  simply  have  to  endure  the  consequences  or  may  incur  substantial  costs 
restructuring matters741. 
Again, shareholder choice ties in nicely to the “enabling” role of the corporation (to simplify 




it  appears  important  not  to  lose  sight  of  the  theoretical  justifications  which  support  an  enabling 
approach  in  this  matter.  As  discussed  previously,  they  caution  that  regulation  should  not  seek  to 
enforce compliance with a definite set of governance principles and should as much as possible leave 
it  to  corporate  members  to  choose  the  applicable  principles.  […]  In  such  a  context,  it  seems 
preferable that the choice of governance structure remains a decision taken by the corporation rather 
than by regulators”742. 






Indeed,  one  of  the  most  puzzling  aspects  of  the  work  undertaken  by  reform  committees  is  the 
absence  of  any  initiative  aimed  at  ensuring  the  involvement  of  the  shareholders  meeting  in  the 
establishment  of  corporations’  governance  norms.  Under  the  existing  framework,  shareholder 




While  recognizing  the role of  the board as  the default decision‐making authority, Bebchuk 








that  would  “allow  them  in  the  future  to  intervene  regarding  specific  business  decisions  in  the 
manner  and  subject  to  the  limitations  specified  in  these  provisions”745.  Procedural  requirements 
would be designed to circumscribe this power of intervention. 
Perhaps the most appealing aspect of shareholder choice is the relative ease by which it can 
be accomplished, which Bebchuk  refers  to as  the “one  rule  to change  them all” or  “constitutional 
change”  scenario746.  This  constitutional  change  implies  letting  shareholders  initiate  rules‐of‐the‐
game  changes,  notably  in  matters  of  corporate  charter  amendments  and  of  re‐incorporation  in 
other  states. Corporations  can  therefore amend  their  charters or  choose another  jurisdiction with 
more  suitable  corporate  law.  Thus,  this  one  rule  basically  installs  “private  ordering”  as  the  new 






initiate  such  modifications.  As  Bebchuk  notes,  this  change  would  produce  important  impacts  on 
corporate governance with minimal need for government intervention or expensive reform efforts: 
“Making  this  one  basic  change  in  existing  corporate  governance  arrangements would  improve  the 
whole set of corporate governance arrangements over time”748. 












“The  self‐enforcing  model  structures  corporate  decision‐making  processes  to  allow  large  outside 
shareholders to protect themselves from insider opportunism with minimal resort to legal authority, 
including  the courts.  […] Shareholders  […] protect  themselves by  their own voting decisions and by 
exercising transactional rights750. 
Kraakman suggests that there are 5 central features of the self‐enforcing model:  
(1)  Enforcement,  as  much  as  possible,  through  actions  by  direct  participants  in  the  corporate 




by managers  and  controlling  shareholders,  and  the  need  to  control  self‐dealing  to  strengthen  the 
political credibility of a market economy. 
(3)  Reliance  on  procedural  protections  ‐‐  such  as  transaction  approval  by  independent  directors, 











compliance”  that  is  often  to  describe  how  agents might want  to  voluntarily  adhere  to  a  law  (for 
example,  how  directors  may  want  to  follow  an  NLERS  proposed  by  stock‐exchanges).  Self‐
enforcement here relates more to how agents can self‐enforce through voting rights and transaction 
rights, and without resort to the courts752. 
To  make  this  more  concrete,  let’s  look  at  an  example  relating  to  how  the  self‐enforcing 
model could apply in the context of approval of particular transactions: 
For  self‐interested  transactions  between  the  company  and  its  directors,  officers,  or  large 
shareholders, a self‐enforcing statute replaces the permissiveness of the enabling approach (loosely 
policed by courts) and  the ban of  the prohibitory model with approval by  independent directors, a 
majority of non‐interested shareholders, or both753. 
One of the best aspects of the self‐enforcing model  is that it  is very context‐informed. In a 
way,  it builds on top of the legal, market and financial  institutions in a given context, as well as  its 
norms  of  behaviour  and  its  ownership  structure  distribution754.  Kraakman  and  Black  initially 
conceived  of  the  model  as  particularly  efficient  for  developing  or  restructuring  economies,  like 
Russia,  since  it  is  “robust  when  resources  are  weak”755.  However,  the  main  features  of  the  self‐
enforcing  model  also  seem  desirable  in  a  more  developed  economy  with  more  sophisticated 





law  framework, we perceive  its usefulness more as a model  to  reinforce how  internal governance 









Both  scandals  and  reforms  have  been  numerous  in  the  past  decade.  Perhaps  the  most 





the Wake  of  the  Sarbanes‐Oxley  Act:  A  Morality  Tale  for  Policymakers  Too757,  Harvard  professor 
Robert Clark deconstructs  the  reform  into  three broad categories of  changes:  (1) audit,  (2) board, 
and (3) disclosure changes. 
First,  audit  changes  focused  on  the  presentation  of  financial  data  by  accountants  to 
investors and aimed to simplify “obscure, confusing, incomplete and misleading” statements758. The 
audit changes included: (1) limits on the multiple roles and services of auditors759, (2) shift in power 
to  hire  and  compensate  external  auditors760  (through  the  audit  committee  only,  rather  than 
management  or  the  board),  (3)  reduction  of  bonding  between  auditors  and  the  corporation761 
(limiting personnel flow between entities), (4) new internal control processes762 (attestations about 
internal  reporting),  (5)  certification  of  financial  reports763  (executives must  personally  attest  they 
have  reviewed  the  reports  and  find  them  “fair  and  complete  in  all material  respects”764),  and  (6) 
financial literacy for audit committee members765. 
Second, board changes  focused on reducing conflicts of  interest and making  it more  likely 
that  “directors  will  act  as  judgemental  monitors  of  management  rather  than  as  reciprocating 
colleagues”766.  The board changes  included:  (1) a majority of  independent directors  (accompanied 
by  a  stricter  notion  of  independence),  (2)  mandatory  presence  of  key  audit,  compensation  and 
nominating committees (strengthened by the requirement that all directors on key committees be 
independent)  and  (3)  active  board  management  (regular  executive  sessions,  periodic  self‐
assessments and adherence to new ethical guidelines)767. 
Third, disclosure  changes  focused on  providing  better  information  to  shareholders, which 
will increase the quality of their decision‐making. The disclosure changes included new requirements 









the  question  of  whether  sufficient  benefits  would  ever  be  generated  to  make  the  reforms 
worthwhile. As an example, compliance costs for the Fortune 1000 companies was on average $7.8 
million,  or  in  aggregate  around  $35  Billion  overall  for  American  companies769.  Not  only  did  these 
numbers blow away by at least 40X the SEC’s predicted compliance estimate, their regressive nature 
also imposed a particularly high compliance burden on smaller companies770. 










Finally, as pertains  to substantive content of  the reforms, Clark notes  that while  targeting 
problem  areas,  like  audit  and  board  responsibility, was  important  in  reaction  to  Enron  and  other 
corporate scandals, other  reforms might have proved more efficient and  less costly. To  this point, 
Clark  frequently  mentions  shareholder  empowerment  reforms,  which  are  only  “atmospherically 
supported”  in SOX772. More specifically, he believes  that  the changes to proxy rules and to reform 
corporate elections (which was abandoned by SOX reform despite significant academic support), as 
well as the changes to de‐stagger boards, might have proven more impactful: 
“Studies about  the  impacts of  the most costly  reforms,  those concerning audit practices and board 
independence,  are  fairly  inconclusive  or  negative,  while  studies  about  proposals  for  shareholder 
empowerment  and  reduction  of  managerial  entrenchment  indicate  that  changes  in  these  areas  – 
which  in  general  are  only  atmospherically  supported  by  the  SOX‐related  changes  –  could  have 
significant positive impacts”773. 
In  Canada,  SOX has  been  a main  driver  influencing  reform projects.  That  said,  as  detailed 
earlier,  other  ambitious  corporate  and  securities  laws  reforms  have  considerably  changed  the 
governance landscape in the past decade, in many ways making it even more shareholder‐friendly. 
3.3.2 A Few “Untouched Paths” 









First,  the basic allocation of powers among  the  triad  could be  revised  to accommodate a 





directors781.  Bebchuk,  in  the  two  key  articles  The  Case  for  Increasing  Shareholder  Power782  and 
Letting  Shareholders  Set  the  Rules783,  also  proposes  allowing  shareholders  to  initiate  rules‐of‐the‐
game decisions,  like  amending  the  corporate  charter  and  re‐incorporation. As Bebchuk notes,  the 
goal  is  not  a  radical  re‐distribution  of  power  in  the  triad,  but  rather  marginal  increases  in 
shareholder  powers  that  will  allow  shareholders  to  meaningfully  govern  themselves  in  a  self‐
enforced way (using voting rights, not courts). 
Second, particular transaction rules could be revised in a number of helpful ways.  
For  related‐party  transactions,  reform  should  most  likely  center  around  executive 
compensation. In Pay Without Performance, Bebchuk and Fried outline two types of reforms to curb 
excess pay, especially related to the camouflage and decoupling problems we discussed earlier. The 
two types of pay  reforms aim to  (1)  improve  transparency and  (2)  improve pay arrangements. On 
the  one  hand,  transparency  could  be  improved  by:  (1)  placing  a  dollar  value  on  all  forms  of 
compensation,  (2) disclosing all non‐deductible compensation,  (3) expensing options,  (4)  reporting 
the relationship between pay and performance, (5) disclosing option and share unloading784. On the 
other  hand,  pay  arrangements  could  be  improved  by:  (1)  reducing  windfalls  in  equity‐based 
compensation, (2) reducing windfalls in bonus plans, (3) limiting the unwinding of equity incentives, 







For  major  transactions,  we  could  see  reforms  around  the  key  areas  of  (1)  approval,  (2) 
takeover defences and resistance, and (3) remedies. First, in terms of approval, corporate state law 
could provide new defaults for certain transactions to better protect shareholders, such as “majority 
of  minority  voting”  or  “unanimous  board  approval”  for  significant  transactions  (like  sale  and 
purchase  of  assets  that  do  not  meet  the  criteria  of  a  major  transaction  usually  requiring  a  full 
shareholder vote)787. Second, takeovers are a particularly challenging area of reform. While they are 
rare,  they  are  complex  and  evolve  rapidly.  As  Bainbridge  notes:  “Making  corporate  law  requires 
careful balancing of these competing values. Nowhere has this proven more challenging than with 
respect to corporate takeover defences”788. One common proposal is that shareholders approve the 




[managers]  lose  one  election  conducted  over  an  acquisition  offer”789.  Easterbrook  and  Fischel 
advocate  the  somewhat  radical  idea  of  “no  resistance”,  which  pleads  for  the  passivity  of  the 
incumbent  board  of  the  target  in  the  context  of  a  tender  offer,  in  order  to  reduce  conflicts  of 
interest790. Although Bainbridge (who usually fiercely advocates board authority) does find merit in 
the  idea,  he  also  points  to  the  “rare  and  sporadic”  nature  of  takeovers  to  disclaim  the  potential 
overall benefits of the no resistance position791. Third, remedies could also be developed to better 
protect  shareholders.  Remedies  could  be  enhanced  through  corporate  law  (developing  a  more 
expansive oppression remedy in the US) or through additional transaction rights (including takeout 
rights where minority  shareholders  can  sell  their  shares  to  the acquirer of a  controlling  stake  in a 
firm at  a  fair  price792).  Finally,  Bebchuk  suggests  that  takeover  efficiency  specifically  could  also be 
greatly  improved  by  letting  shareholders  amend  corporate  charters  to  opt‐out  of  state  corporate 
law provisions or by re‐incorporating in other states793.  
Third,  private  enforcement  mechanisms  could  also  enhance  shareholder  access  to 
governance  reform.  Two  interesting  ideas  stand  out  here.  On  the  one  hand,  Black  suggests  in 
passing the idea of a “lighter regime”794, which would reduce the cost of action for shareholders. For 
example,  proxy  rules  and mandatory  disclosure  rules  could  be  simplified  or  relaxed.  Black  notes: 
“Under  a  less obstructive, more  facilitating  legal  regime,  institutions might do much more”795. On 
the other hand, Rousseau proposes that boards of public corporations should have the “obligation 
to  adopt  their  governance principles  in  a  by‐law and  submit  it  to  the  approval  of  shareholders  at 
every annual meeting”796. This proposal seems to have a number of benefits, including (1) increased 
shareholder  participation,  (2)  better  transparency  into  corporate  governance  principles  and 
decisions  followed  by  the  firm,  and  (3)  new  incentives  for management  to  adopt  good  corporate 
governance practices and co‐operate with shareholders, or risk a just‐say no vote that could damage 








Due  to  agency  costs  and  to  the  separation  of  ownership  and  control  in  the  modern 
corporation, a divergence of interests exists between Insiders and Outsiders. 
These conflicts can pertain to general governance issues or to particular transactions. Some 
examples  of  these  conflicts  include  self‐dealing,  misappropriation,  insider  trading,  executive 
compensation, corporate elections and major transactions. 
These conflicts, as we have seen, are not unavoidable. 








set  some  governance  rules  on  their  own  would  likely  be  beneficial.  Government  intervention  to 
increase  shareholder  power  would  inititially  be  needed  to  set  the  framework  for  increased 
shareholder  activism,  yet  would  eventually  make  way  for  more  organic  rule‐setting  inside  the 
corporation itself. 




believe  that  conferring  additional  power  to  corporate  agents  themselves  (especially  shareholders) 
should allow value‐maximizing  setting of  rules, better protection of  the 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